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ABSTRACT
Towards Satu Bangsa: A Reevaluation of the Race-Based
Narrative and Its Impact on Chinese Communities in Malaysia
by
LIM Chun Lean
Master of Philosophy

Pakatan Harapan has terminated Barisan Nasional’s 61-year rule in Malaysia through the
ballot box in the 2018 14th General Election (GE14) of Malaysia. The regime change did
not happen overnight; it resulted from (a) the democratization progress in Malaysia over
decades, (b) the exposure of corruption and crime related to top tier government officials,
and (c) the changing political landscape of Malay political parties. Criticism from the people
and its coalition and party overwhelmed Najib Razak and Barisan Nasional. On the other
hand, Pakatan Harapan successfully incorporated all the opposition voices to vote against
Najib’s regime, but the opposition front, too, had its dilemma. Pakatan Harapan had the
same enemies but did not have a firm ideological foundation across parties. This issue was
soon back to haunt them while they were in the reign. Barisan Nasional brought up many
race and religion issues that Pakatan Harapan did not have a counter-narrative to respond.
Hence, the Pakatan Harapan government collapsed in 21-month during a political coup.
Pakatan Harapan’s fall was due to many reasons. However, the main one was its
failure to address Malay anxieties. The Malay anxieties were rooted in the race-based
narrative used by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) since the 1950s. To
make a comeback, the opposition alliance needed an alternative discourse to combat
UMNO’s race card. In this thesis, I investigate the nature of race-based narrative and
suggest an alternative way to interpret the history of Malaysia, i.e., the Bangsa-based
narrative. Bangsa is a Malay word that carries many meanings like race, nationality,
ethnicity, and locality, but all denote unity. Through understanding the idea of bangsa, we
can see how Malaysians revise their imagination of collective at different times and thus
formulate an alternate discourse other than the race-based narrative. Furthermore, I will use
Malaysian Chinese as a case study to show how we can apply bangsa as a lens to read their
history. Chapters One to Three analyse the political competition in Malaysia. Chapters Four
to Six introduce the bangsa-based narrative. Chapters Seven to Nine examine the history of
Malaysian Chinese through this new perspective.

I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and I
warrant that all citations o f previous research, published or unpublished, have been duly
acknowledged.
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis claims that the Malay elites monopolize the state power by stabilizing the
ethnic hierarchy in Malaysia. They subscribe to communal politics that assume ethnic
representation in the state is proportionated to the structure of power-sharing in the nation.
Hence, Malaysians are often overwhelmed by the race-based ideology and believe that
the quadripartite division of Malay-Chinese-Indian-Others (MCIO) is natural. Political
competition in Malaysia, too, is easily resurfaced as racial conflicts. However, changes in
the political landscape are usually resulted from rivalries between Malay elites, while race
issues are the effect rather than the cause.
This explains why Pakatan Harapan collapses within twenty-one months because
when Barisan Nasional falls, its legacy endures, i.e., the race-based narrative. Barisan
Nasional manipulates the Malay sentiment in the communities and solicits with
lawmakers in the government by calling to restoration for the Malay dominance in the
state power. In February 2020, the rule of Pakatan Harapan is officially terminated by a
political coup devised by the ultra-Malay alliance. Led by Muhyiddin Yassin, this ultraMalay alliance occupied by three large Malay-based power blocs and renders
representations of other ethnicities almost irrelevant. More than ever, the Malay elites
control the state; but also more than ever, the dispute among Malay elites is intricated.
Therefore, a reevaluation of the race-based narrative becomes a necessity for
national reform at this particular juncture. Firstly, Malaysians need an alternative national
discourse other than the race-based narrative that is favored to the Malay elites. Secondly,
Malaysians need a different knowledge to understand the intricacies of state power as
conflicts in politics are not ethnically defined in essence. Thirdly, Malaysians need a
collective narrative that belong to all citizen regardless of race to progress as one united
nation, like the title suggests, satu bangsa.
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In Part One, I explain how the Malay elites and their conflicts shape the political
discourse and landscape in Malaysia. In Part Two, I trace the historical thread of bangsa
and integrate the race-based narrative into a larger discursive space of the bangsa narrative.
In Part Three, I reconceptualize Chinese in Malaysia from the perspective of bangsa and
investigate their historical subjectivities through four critical moments in history.

POLITICAL DISCOURSES IN MALAYSIA
The MCIO ethnic classification system is introduced by the British in the late nineteenth
century to better rule the local workforce. The British established the Pangkor Agreement
with the Sultan in the mid-1870s that allowed them to seize full control over three states
in the peninsula. The laborers imported from China, India, and Indonesia quickly
outnumbered the natives. To enhance the direct rule, the British classified the laborers
into four boxes and separated them into different economic sectors that associated with
different social role and connotation, i.e., the lazy Malay, the greedy Chinese, and the
obedient Indian. The division among races intensified and the effort of acculturation for
centuries was immediately disrupted.
The influence of nationalism started to penetrate the Malay Archipelagoes in the
early twentieth century. While Chinese and Indians were devoted to the development in
their homeland, Malays saw the Malay states as their identical home. The Malay
intellectuals articulated their identity to a broader Malay unity instead of their separate
sultanates. These propagandas were rapidly disseminated across the peninsula with the
rise of print capitalism. As a result, Malays began to see colonialism as the nemesis of
their communities. On the one hand, the Malay nationalists attacked the Malay
aristocracies as they sacrifice the Malay interest for the British in exchange of their
personal gain. On the other hand, they claimed that Malays are the anak negeri (son of
the state) and saw other ethnicities as the bangsa-bangsa asing (foreign races). These
Malay nationalists replaced the Malay aristocracies as spokesman of the Malay
2

communities. The 1930s witnessed a flourish of Malay nationalist associations. Led by
Dato Onn Jaafar, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) has founded in 1946
after the War to advance the independence of Malaya. UMNO effectively mobilized
support from Malays across the peninsula and collaborated with other non-Malay racebased parties in the 1950s.
The Malay elites in UMNO engendered a different national imagination than the
early Malay nationalists. UMNO realized that the demography of peninsular Malaya was
not significantly favored to the Malays. As shown in the table, the Chinese population
actually outnumbered the Malay population in 1947. Inciting the Malay-foreigner
antagonism might eventually lead to a backfire from Chinese and Indian communities.
Therefore, UMNO decided to refashion the MCIO ethnic classification system into their
script. UMNO adopted the communal politics that emphasizes on the balance of ethnic
representation in the state power. Subsequently, UMNO formed an alliance, which named
Alliance Party, by collaborating with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the
Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). This tripartite UMNO-MCA-MIC’s partnership
showcases a new national imagination, i.e., the race-based narrative.
There are three ways to spot the race-based narrative in everyday life: (a) the
overemphasis of racial identity; (b) the romanticization of race; and (c) all issues can be
escalated to race issues.
Malayan seemed to be satisfied with this national ideology as the Alliance Party
won the 1st General Election (GE1) in 1955 almost uncontestably. This race-based
configuration assumes a Malay dominance with the Malay-Chinese-Indian partnership, as
the Federal Constitution dictates. According to Article 153, the ruler should safeguard the
special position of the Malays and other natives. Wang Gung-wu, too, argues that
‘Malayan nationalism consists of two component parts: a nucleus of Malay nationalism
enclosed by the idea of Malay-Chinese-Indian partnership’ (Wang 1981, p. 205).
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Political competition in Malaysia has been dominated by a stable two-coalition
structure since 1955. The UMNO-led Alliance/Barisan Nasional hold office from the start
until its defeat in the 14th General Election in 2018 but soon restore its power in the state
within two years. UMNO used the same old tactic – the race card – to create turbulence
in the ruling coalition and in the society at large. Immediately after the cabinet has formed,
UMNO probed that three major appointments, i.e., Minister of Finance, Chief Justice,
Attorney General, were filled by non-Malays. In the late 2018, the government’s attempt
to rectify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) has been forced to stop as it caused much discontentment from
the right-wing Malay communities. In the mid-2019, the introduction of Jawi calligraphy
to the Bahasa Malaysia textbook was accused as Islamization by the Chinese education
groups and communities despite the fact that it takes only four pages. In the late 2019,
UMNO proposed to form a bigger Malay unity through inviting other major Malay power
bloc, including a ruling party, in the Malay Dignity Congress. These incidents stroked the
chord of ethnic sentiments among the people. Polarization between Malays and nonMalays reached its height after series of incitement. UMNO seized the opportunity to
insurrect a coup d'état to overthrow the government in February 2020. Pakatan Harapan
failed to address the Malay sentiments but the race issues are not the root cause of its
defeat. The reason led to the downfall of Pakatan Harapan is its failure to establish a new
national discourse other than the race-based ideology.
That is a necessity to understand the mechanism and intention of race-based
narrative in order to disrupt this deep-rooted ideology in Malaysia. Malay elites
consolidate their state power through stabilizing the ethnic hierarchy. Whenever there was
a challenge to their leadership, the Malay elites would resurface it as jeopardizing the
Malay special position or the racial harmony. More importantly, the rivalries in political
arena are seldom ethnically defined. In reality, almost all political turbulences are caused
by the conflicts among Malay elites over different non-race issues. For example, the 1969
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racial riot is often characterized as a tragic outbreak between Malays and non-Malays after
the 4th General Election (GE4) that year. Scholar Kua Kia Soong claims that it was
actually a UMNO internal conflict, which the Abdul Razak’s state capitalist sect’s attempt
to oust Tunku’s aristocratic sect. Therefore, the race issues are often the effect of a
political motive rather than the cause of it.

PERSPECTIVES OF THE BANGSA NARRATIVE
This thesis draws a conceptual resource from the Malay sociopolitical culture, i.e., the
idea of bangsa. Bangsa is a Malay word carries multiple meaning including race, ethnicity,
people, tribe, state, nation, community, citizenship, nationality, etc., and its denotation
continues to develop until now. Although its meaning varies in different times and spaces,
all connotes a certain kind of unity or communal solidarity. Therefore, through examining
the historical development of bangsa, one can understand the changing perception of unity
in this land. This bangsa approach is not an antithesis to the race-based narrative but an
attempt to incorporate the modern invention of race into a holistic and larger Malay
sociopolitical discursive space. Therefore, one can started to understand racialism or
communalism is not the way we did in the past and hence not necessarily the way we need
to continue doing in the future.
The bangsa narrative identifies four phases of development in the Malaysian
history that dated back to the early Malay civilization. The first phase is the Indianized
Hindu-Buddhist Kingdom Era; the second phase is the Islamized Muslim Sultanate Era;
the third phase is the Modern Malay Nationalist Era; and the fourth phase is the
Contemporary Malaysian Nationalist Era.
In the Indianized Hindu-Buddhist Kingdom Era, one sees the raja (ruler) as the
ultimate figure and regards himself or herself as the rakyat (subject) of his majesty. This
raja-rakyat configuration is built upon the system of kerajaan – being in a state of having
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a raja, and it infiltrates into all aspects of their quotidian life. These raja-centric polities
identify themselves as respective bangsa in accordance with their raja’s dominant
territories, e.g. the Srivijaya empire and the Majapahit empire.
In the Islamized Muslim Sultanate Era, sultan replaced raja as rulers of the Malay
territories, and kesultanan replaced kerajaan as the political entities. The political function
of kesultanan is basically the same as the kerajaan, but kesultanan converted the state and
royal religion from Hindu-Buddhist to Islam. These Muslim state started to define Islam
as a major feature for being a Malay. Therefore, since the rise of Malacca sultanate, a
bangsa is not only manifested through the polity but also the religion, and ties among the
respective sultan-centric polities started to strengthen in the name of Islam.
In the Modern Malay Nationalist Era, influences of the Malay intellectuals and
the Malay elites surpasses the Malay aristocracies. After the establishment of Pangkor
Treaty in 1874, the British dominated all aspects of the socioeconomic life in the
Sultanates of Perak, Selangor, Pahang, and Negeri Sembilan. Hence, Malays across the
peninsula shared the same discontentment towards the rulers. Under this circumstance,
the Malay elites rise as the representatives of rakyat to voice against colonizers, aristocrats,
and foreigners. This shed light on the rise of Malay nationalism and the flourish of elitecentric nationalist groups since the 1930s. The Malay elites coined the term bangsa
Melayu (Malay race) as an antithesis to bangsa Malayan (Malayan race) and the term
kadaulatan rakyat (people’s sovereignty) as an antithesis to kedaulatan raja (raja’s
sovereignty). These propagandas emphasizes that the Malay peoples are the owner of this
Malay lands. In this moment, kebangsaan replaced kerajaan and kesultanan to become
the most influential concept in the Malay society. The feature of the first stage of bangsa
Melayu is racism and democracy, while the second stage is communalism, and the third
stage is communalism and regionalism. Bangsa Melayu started as an advocacy of Malay
popular right in the prewar period, and gradually shifted to a partnership model to
collaborate with other ethnic groups to advance the Independence in the postwar period;
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after the outbreak of 1969 riots, the Malay elites extended their influence on more
regionalist and indigenous groups. The fundament of bangsa Melayu remains unchanged
but its cooperation across the nation becomes more complex and sophisticated throughout
the time.
In the Contemporary Malaysian Nationalist Era, the Malay nationalism has
appeared too racist and unappealing not only to non-Malays but also some Malay leftists.
Besides, Mahathir Mohammad was aware the development of opposition power as his
chairmanship and premiership was almost lost to Tengku Razaleigh in the 1987 UMNO
Party Election. This historic fracture among Malay elites prompted Mahathir to seek more
support from the non-Malays. Therefore, Mahathir presented the idea of bangsa Malaysia
in 1991, but it was an ideological amendment of the idea of bangsa Melayu than an
authentic transformation. Under the umbrella of bangsa Malaysia, Malaysian found an
official discourse to accommodate all citizen into one united narrative, the Malays are
refashion into Melayu Baru (New Malays) that associates with values of bourgeois and
progressive Islam, and Malaysia repositioned itself as one of a leaders of the wave of
Asianization in the 1990s. During then, the state changed Bahasa Melayu (Malay
language) to Bahasa Malaysia (Malaysian language) although they are the same and
promoted the spirit of merdeka through commercials. This state-defined bangsa Malaysia
is a presentation of ketuanan Melayu in a subtle form; nonetheless, it prepares Malaysian
to reimagine the nation. Mahathir’s leadership was challenged again in 1998 when his
deputy Anwar Ibrahim disagree with him on handling the financial crisis. Anwar was
sacked and jailed but the largest social movement in the history of Malaysia also took
place, i.e., the reformasi movement. Quickly, reformasi went beyond Anwar and became
a space to incorporate all contestation against the state. Dr. Noor argues that ‘a multitude
of disparate claims and concerns are being articulated under the general rubric of
reformasi, as an all-encompassing hegemonic project’ (Noor 1999, p.6). Some writers
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also coined the term bangsa reformasi which indicates that the script of bangsa Malaysia
went out of control by the state and started to be defined by the people at large.

RECONCEPTUALIZING MALAYSIAN CHINESE
The changing conception of bangsa defines the identification of local inhabitants. Patterns
of the local consciousness is subjected to change in accordance with how the public
interprets the idea of bangsa. For example, Chinese in Malaya/Malaysia reimagine their
relationship with homeland and locality every time when bangsa is added a new
connotation. Accordingly, the history of Malaysian Chinese can be divided into three
periods: (a) imagining China; (b) appropriating China; and (c) unimagining China.
The stage of Imagining China ranges from 1860 to 1946 when Chinese regards
China as their homeland. To effectively recruit laborers from China, the British
established the Sino-British Convention with the Qing Dynasty in 1860. Followingly,
China withdrew the sea ban and the mass migration wave began. These Chinese migrants
see China as zhongyuan (central) and Malaya as nanyang (south sea) which indicates their
desire to back in the central land. The nationalist and communist propagandas from China
also disseminated among Chinese communities quickly in the early twentieth century. In
addition, the MCIO ethnic classification system and the Malay antagonism further draw
Chinese away from the local politics. Chinese become the bangsa-bangsa asing that have
no weight and right in the Malaya.
The stage of Appropriating China ranges from 1946 to 1998 when Chinese
regards China as cultural capital to be appropriated to counter the overwhelming Malay
dominance. Founded in 1949, MCA is the first Chinese-based political party in Malaya.
Although it associated with many bad names in recent decades, MCA played an important
role to safeguard Chinese interest in the road to Malaya Independence. Joining hand with
UMNO, MCA became a major power bloc in the state formation. However, MCA
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conceded to the controversial Article 153 that underplays the non-Malay rights.
Institutionally, Chinese can never become the core of the bangsa Melayu or bangsa
Malaysia. Chinese are merely their partner. To fill the void in their national identity,
Chinese strengthen their Chineseness through preserving the Chinese culture and
education.
The stage of Unimagining China begins from 1998 when Chinese articulate their
Chineseness not from China but from the locality. The influence of MCA in Chinese
communities started to decline in the millennium as it behaves too obedient to UMNO
and constantly downplays the Chinese interest. Over 222 parliamentary seats, MCA won
31 seats in 2004, won 15 seats in 2008, won 7 seats in 2013, won only 1 seat in 2018 and
that seat is mixed constituency with Malay majority. Data indicates that 95% of the
Chinese cast their vote to the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP) or other
non-race-based parties in Pakatan Harapan. Chinese rationale in politics also changed as
they concern more about the socioeconomic matters than race issues in front of the ballot
box. They comfortably fit in the bangsa Malaysia without overemphasizing their ethnic
identity.
In conclusion, I explain how the Malay elites rise in the early nineteenth century
along with the nationalist movement and how they exploit the race-based narrative to
monopolize the state power. Then, I claim that the race-based narrative can be incorporate
into a larger discursive space of bangsa that sees race as a postcolonial artifact rather than
the Malaysian nature. Last but not least, I reconceptualize the identity of Malaysian
Chinese through the lens of bangsa.
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PART I
POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN MALAYSIA
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CHAPTER 1
POLITICAL RIVALRY IN MALAYSIA

Political competition in Malaysia has been dominated by a stable two-coalition structure
since 1955. In the 1940s, the immediate postwar era, British Malaya saw an ascend of
race-based parties across the peninsula. Amongst them were United Malays National
Organization (UMNO), Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and Malayan Indian
Congress (MIC), which represented their communal interest, i.e., Malays, Chinese,
Indians, respectively. On the other hand, dissidents from UMNO formed the National
Party (Parti Negara) by offering a non-ethnic-based ideology to fellow Malayans. In
response to the challenge, UMNO, MCA and MIC came together as a united front, named
the Alliance Party (ALLIANCE), to contest against Parti Negara in the 1955 General
Election (GE). In result, the ALLIANCE commanded majority support across the
peninsula, while the two-coalition structure has also consolidated ever since.
Notably, UMNO alone swept 34 out of 52 parliamentary seats in the GE and
totally outnumbered the seats won by MCA and MIC, which rendered UMNO the most
influential party in ALLIANCE. As a matter of course, the UMNO-cum-ALLIANCE’s
leader Tunku Abdul Rahman was sworn in as the first Prime Minister of Malaya in 1957,
the year of independence. Soon, Tunku faced the dilemma of seeking an equilibrium
relationship between the Malay and non-Malay communities. On the one hand, Tunku
was responsible for promoting a firm national identity to unite all Malaysians; on the other
hand, he needed to advance the interest of Malays. Eventually, his juggling policies
proved to be a failure when the racial riot broke out on 13 May 1969. Before Abdul Razak
took over the premiership from Tunku, Tunku’s cabinet had been forced to transfer its
political power to the National Operation Council (NOC), an Emergency administrative
body headed by Razak, when the State of Emergency was declared immediately after the
riot. Soon, Razak announced the National Economic Policy (NEP), and through which to
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reengineer the social hierarchy between the Malays and the non-Malays. Until Mahathir
published The Malay Dilemma in 1970, claiming that the Malay indigeneity needed to be
preserved and rejecting the Chinese hegemony and Imperialist influence, it effectively
substantialized the race-based ideology of NEP. (Mohamad 1970)
Razak dissolved the three-party ALLIANCE and reorganized it into a broader
united front, named Barisan Nasional (BN), in 1973, which encompassed nine parties
from UMNO, MCA, MIC to other regional parties in Sabah and Sarawak. Razak intended
to centralize the constitutional power under UMNO’s belt and yielded more support from
people through asserting Barisan Nasional’s influence on the other end of the political
spectrum. Razak’s tactic was proven successful in the forthcoming Elections as Barisan
Nasional has never failed to secure a two-thirds supermajority in parliament until 2008.
Followed by the rise of Barisan Nasional, the opposition parties were sidelined and forced
to seek collaboration from each other to combat against the ruling coalition, albeit having
a different political ideology.
Parties in the opposition camp have different political narratives and agendas. In
response to UMNO-BN’s dominance, there were two major opposition blocs: the social
democrats and the Malay-Muslim dissidents. Democratic Action Party (DAP), founded
in 1965, dominated by the Chinese, falls into the former category; Parti Islam Se-Malaysia
(PAS, Malaysian Islamic Party), founded in 1951, represented the Muslim communities
in Malaysia, belongs to the latter category. Notwithstanding that both opposition blocs
rejected the UMNO-BN’s reign, there was no alignment between them as they had
fundamental ideological differences. However, the political dynamics started to change
in 1987 when UMNO’s internal conflicts were intensified. Led by Tengku Razaleigh
Hamzah, a sect of members challenged Mahathir Mohammad’s chairmanship – thenUMNO-cum-BN’s leader and Prime Minister. Eventually, the coup has failed, but the
dissidents formed a party, named Parti Melayu Semangat 46 (S46, Spirit of 46 Malay
Party), to continue its battle against UMNO-BN in the parliament. Soon, S46 negotiated
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with all opposition parties and successfully formed an alliance to contest against Barisan
Nasional in the 1990 GE8. The opposition alliance did not crush the Barisan Nasional’s
two-thirds supermajority; nonetheless, it showcased the possibility of collaboration
among opposition parties, i.e., the alignment between the social democrats and the MalayMuslim dissidents.
The opposition alliance was merely short-term cooperation for the GE8 and GE9,
and it was formally disbanded in 1996. In 1997, Malaysians experienced the Asian
Financial Crisis, while Mahathir and his Deputy Anwar Ibrahim had a different opinion
on handling the Crisis. Months later, Anwar was charged with several corruption and
sodomy cases that many deem as a politically motivated act to dismantle Anwar’s
challenge to Mahathir. Anwar was sacked as the Deputy Prime Minister, expelled from
UMNO and arrested in September 1998. Soon after the arrest, Anwar and his supporter
initiated the reformasi movement to protest against the prosecution of Anwar and call for
the resignation of Mahathir; still, Anwar was sentenced to six-year imprisonment.
However, the reformasi movement successfully led to the formation of the Parti Keadilan
Rakyat (KEADILAN, People's Justice Party), which drastically changed the political
landscape in Malaysia.
KEADILAN rejected the Mahathir-led authoritarian state and its cronies from the
beginning. KEADILAN aimed for promoting socio-economic justice and eliminating all
forms of political corruption within a non-racial framework. Its leader Anwar spent a
significant amount of time in jail from 1998 until a royal pardon was issued in 2018; still,
he remained a symbolic figure of the party, just like the spirit of the reformasi movement
became a foundation for KEADILAN insofar as the entire opposition bloc since 1999. In
1999, Mahathir called for an Election after putting Anwar in prison. Ten opposition parties,
including KEADILAN, DAP, PAS and the other regional parties, formed the Barisan
Alternatif (BA, Alternative Front) to contest against the Mahathir-led Barisan Nasional.
Despite the defeat, Barisan Alternatif won 42 out of 193 parliamentary seats in the 1999
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GE12. Unlike the 1990 GE8, where there was two opposition front that represented the
two-strand political ideology, Barisan Alternatif was a united opposition alliance
encompassing both the Malay-Muslim dissidents and the social democrats, because
Anwar, as an early Muslim activist in Malaysia and a critic of Mahathir-led UMNO,
resonated the narratives from both ends. As a result, the Anwar-led Barisan Alternatif
united the opposition camp and further stabilized the two-coalition structure of political
competition in Malaysia since 1999.
Nonetheless, Barisan Alternatif did not last more than six years. After its defeat
to the fifth Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi-led Barisan Nasional in the 2004 GE11,
Barisan Alternatif was formally dissolved due to PAS’s advocacy of establishing an
Islamic State and several unresolved infightings on the issue of seat allocation. The
collapse of Barisan Alternatif indicated that the consensus among opposition parties was
a question yet to address, notwithstanding that the reformasi movement inspired a more
determined orientation in 1999. After Anwar freed from imprisonment in 2004, he
continued to work with opposition parties to seek every possibility to collaborate again in
the upcoming Election. Subsequently, Anwar invited the previous Barisan Alternatif’s
component parties to reunite as a new opposition front, the Pakatan Rakyat (PR, People's
Pact). Although Pakatan Rakyat had no difference from Barisan Alternatif in terms of its
aims and ideology, it did articulate a more comprehensive framework on its plan to
advance democracy, equality and the economy in Malaysia, which outlined in Buku
Jingga. (Pasuni 2012, p.1) Besides, KEADILAN and other opposition parties actively
involved in a social movement named BERSIH (Coalition for Clean and Fair Election)
since 2005. The BERSIH movement sought to reform the electoral system and
successfully resonated with people across the nation. Eventually, Pakatan Rakyat won 82
out of 222 parliamentary seats and five states in the 2008 GE12. On the other hand,
Pakatan Rakyat ended Barisan Nasional’s two-thirds supermajority, suggesting that the
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people were more open to departing from the orthodox UMNO-BN’s race-based policies
and ruling ideology.
Under pressure within UMNO, Abdullah decided to step down as Prime Minister
and handed over to Najib Razak one year after the Election. Najib was known for
introducing the 1-MALAYSIA programme and the Bantuan Rakyat 1-MALAYSIA
(BR1M, Government's Aid for The People) scheme during his tenure. The 1-MALAYSIA
programme was launched as a government franchise covering several public services,
including clinics, housing, internet, groceries, tourism, et cetera. The BR1M scheme
provided one-off financial aids, ranging from RM250 to RM1000, to low-income
households. Najib received popularity, especially from the Malay grassroots, through
these projects. However, the non-Malays remained unsatisfied with the UMNO-BN’s rule
because of the shrinking economy and corruption. Therefore, UMNO, too, quickly
realized that, in the future Elections, their battlefield would rather be the Malay heartland
in the peninsula than the stubborn non-Malays voters. Hence, UMNO decided to bring the
race and religious issues to further escalation to secure support from the Malays.
In response to the UMNO’s weakened position, the Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa
(PERKASA, Mighty Native Organisation,), a non-governmental organization advocating
to uphold the special position of bumiputera, was founded in 2008, immediately after the
Election. [1] PERKASA claimed themselves as protectors of Article 153 of the
Constitution of Malaysia, a law to safeguard the interest of Malays and Natives in
Malaysia. PERKASA does not have a direct relationship to UMNO, but many deem there
were ties among them. In the next few years, PERKASA actively organized rallies and
made provocative speeches against the non-Malays and the non-Muslims, such as
organizing a counter-protest against BERSIH, distributing white angpows during Chinese
New Year, burning Malay language Bibles, denying Chin Peng’s ashes returning to
Malaysia, et cetera. The PERKASA’s anti-non-Malay-Muslims narrative had coincided
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with the UMNO-BN’s script in the future Election; hence, a few PERKASA’s key leaders
became UMNO’s candidate to contest in the 2013 GE13.
Still, Najib failed to restore the two-thirds supermajority to Barisan Nasional in
2013 and experienced a further setback. In contrast to 140 parliamentary seats secured in
the 2008 GE12, Barisan Nasional lost seven more seats in 2013, resulting in 133 seats.
Despite the mishaps, UMNO’s performance has improved, as it alone secured 88 seats,
i.e., nine more seats have gained compared to the last Election. In fact, MCA was
accountable for Barisan Nasional’s regression because it only won seven seats compared
to fifteen seats in 2013. Therefore, some analysts characterized the 2013 GE13 as a
‘Chinese Tsunami’, suggesting that a large chunk of Chinese voters has swung from MCA
to DAP and KEADILAN. (Lee & Thock 2014, p. 24) As a result, the non-Malay
representatives in Barisan Nasional were in a more disproportionate position to UMNO.
UMNO became the dominant party in Barisan Nasional more than ever and rendered its
allied parties, i.e., MCA, MIC and other regional parties in Sabah and Sarawak, irrelevant.
Under this circumstance, the political competition between Barisan Nasional and Pakatan
Rakyat (later, Pakatan Harapan) in the post-2013 GE13 was often misappropriated as a
struggle between the Malay power and the anti-Malay power. Consequently, the racial
tension has reached a high point during the second term of Najib’s administration.
In short, changes in political landscape in Malaysia are highly surrounded with
UMNO’s power in the parliament. According to Bridget Welsh, the state power was less
influential and concentrated before the outbreak of 1969 incident; since 1969, the Malay
political elites started to control the government through implementing a series of racebased policies and establishing state-controlled businesses; in 1999, conflicts between
Mahathir and Anwar had given rise to an opposition electoral alliance that aimed to topple
the UMNO-led administration. (Welsh 2020, pp. 43-47)
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CHAPTER 2
CHANGING LANDSCAPE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

The political landscape in Malaysia has experienced a drastic change after KEADILAN
was established in 1999. KEADILAN successfully incorporates dissenting voices across
all races, and collaborates with other opposition parties over the time, but these electoral
alliances, i.e., Barisan Alternatif (1998-2004), Pakatan Rakyat (2008-2015), Pakatan
Harapan (2015-incumbent), are formed to combat the UMNO-BN’s state monopoly, but
do not showcase consistent ideologies and policies. The loosely-tied opposition pacts have
attracted many political opportunists, and transformed the parliament into a ‘seat-number
race’, which resulted in the fall of Pakatan Harapan in 2020. The rise and fall of Pakatan
Harapan indicates that (a) the UMNO’s race-religious political rhetoric remains unshaken;
(b) the political cronyism is deeply rooted in the parliament; (c) the alternative ideologies
has not yet established by Pakatan Harapan. In the following paragraphs, I will explain
these claims through demonstrating the political dynamic between UMNO-BN and
Pakatan Harapan in the 2010s.
The 2013 GE13 saw the decline of UMNO-BN’s ruling power and the
incompetence of Najib’s leadership. Despite the deterioration of its allied parties, UMNO
set a satisfactory record in the Malay-dominated rural constituencies compared to its rival
– the Muslim-based PAS. Therefore, in the second term of Najib’s administration, UMNO
continued to consolidate its Malay-centric right-wing position. Since the non-Malay
parties in Barisan Nasional have sidelined even further after the Election, UMNO could
easily assert its political agenda upon the Barisan Nasional coalition. The incline of Malay
power within Barisan Nasional chased the non-Malay voters away and attracted the
conservative Malays, which used to support PAS, to its base. Therefore, UMNO focused
on improving the Malay livelihood, upholding Article 153, and put no effort to resolve, if
not to exploit, the racial and religious tension in Malaysia. Conflicts on race and religion
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during this period can trace to two major social activism, i.e., (a) the BERSIH movement;
(b) the HINDRAF movement.
BERSIH, a non-governmental organization (NGO) aiming to reform the electoral
system in Malaysia to ensure a clean and fair political competition, organized five rallies
in Kuala Lumpur from 2007 to 2016. The first three rallies, taking place in Najib’s first
term, protested against collusion between the government and the Elections Commissions
(EC) to prevent several malpractices like gerrymandering, malapportionment, corruption,
cronyism. BERSIH also demanded a reevaluation of the Standard Operation Procedure
(SOP) of the polling station. However, the 2013 GE13 saw massive electoral fraud as
there were phantom voters, unexplained new ballot boxes, a sudden electricity shutdown,
et cetera. (Houghton 2013) Plenty of petitions were filed against the government after the
Election, but Najib, again, failed to address the public’s discontentment. The voices and
forces against the corrupted Najib-led Barisan Nasional have fully awakened in the postElection period. Evidence of Najib’s corruption and crime has gradually unfolded, such
as the 1MDB (1-MALAYSIA Development Berhad) scandal and the Altantuyaa affair [2].
Therefore, except for demands filed in the first three rallies, the BERSIH movements held
in 2015 and 2016 urged Najib to resign from his premiership.
The Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) was formed on 29 December 2005
to call for social attention on the Moorthy case. Moorthy, who died on 20 December 2005,
was a famous Mount Everest climber in Malaysia. He converted to Muslim without
informing his family before passing away. Hence, the religious authority prepared his
funeral under Muslim custom without the consent of his family members, though his wife
insisted that Moorthy was practicing Hindu. She brought the case to the court, but the high
supreme court did not have jurisdiction over it according to the Syariah law. Eventually,
this controversy led to the formation of HINDRAF to call for justice for Moorthy’s family.
(Kaur 2014, p. 341) Except for the Moorthy case, HINDRAF has drawn public attention
to the government infringement of the local Hindu’s rights and heritage since 2007. In
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October 2007, HINDRAF organized rallies to protest against the demolition of a Hindu
shrine in Kuala Lumpur. After that, a few HINDRAF’s leaders were arrested under the
Internal Security Act (ISA). During Najib's reign, the emergence of HINDRAF posed a
challenge to the Muslim-dominated authorities, and people are more aware of the Islamic
influence on the power structure in politics. Due to this controversy, the Muslim-based
PAS departed from the opposition coalition after the 2013 GE13.
BERSIH and HINDRAF, both aim to advance the progress of social equity,
become the two major left-wing forces among the general public. In response, PERKASA
created a foundation of right-wing forces to safeguard the Malay-Muslim special position
in Malaysia. On 16 September 2015, BERSIH was demonstrating in the streets of Kuala
Lumpur to call for Najib’s resignation, while PERKASA also organized a counter-rally
at the same spot to accuse BERSIH’s supporters as anti-Malay extremists. Soon, the
demonstration was depicted as a racial conflict, despite BERSIH supporters being mixed
with all races. Scholars argued that UMNO’s strategy in the 2013 and 2018 GE14 was to
racialize all the social conflicts in order to fit its narrative of ‘Malays in danger, Islam
under threat.’ (Kesser 2014; Ooi 2019, pp. 41-43)
A couple of years after the 2013 GE13, PAS terminated its political cooperation
pact with Pakatan Rakyat because PAS insisted on promoting its agenda on fully
implementing the Syariah law in Malaysia while the allied parties firmly remained in a
secular position. After its withdrawal from the coalition, PAS quickly became embroiled
in an internal dispute. A sect of lawmakers led by Mohamad Sabu disagree with the PAS
president Abdul Hadi Awang and advocated a reformist strand of political Islam. In
September 2015, Mohamad Sabu and a group of progressive leaders officially quitted
PAS and rebranded their sect as the Parti Amanah Negara (AMANAH, National Trust
Party). AMANAH later joined hand with other opposition parties to form Pakatan
Harapan to contest in the 2018 GE14.
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Differences within UMNO was also increasing during Najib’s second term after
the exposure of the 1MDB financial scandal on the Sarawak Report in 2014. The two
most influential leaders opposing Najib’s party presidency were the deputy Muhyiddin
Yassin and the chairman Mahathir Mohammad. They deemed Najib a betrayer of UMNO
and urged him to hand over his leadership to a member who was not involved with
scandals and court cases. Najib refused to do so and sacked both Muhyiddin and Mahathir
from their position. Hence, they were forced to use the external power to remove Najib’s
leadership. In September 2016, Mahathir founded the Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia
(BERSATU, Malaysian United Indigenous Party) and acted as the party chairman while
Muhyiddin was the party president. From an ideological standpoint, UMNO and
BERSATU were indistinguishable. The mission of BERSATU was to replace UMNO on
the decline and restore a strong Malay party into the government. As a race-based party,
BERSATU later had a hard time getting along with other Pakatan Harapan’s left-wing
component parties.
Pakatan Rakyat was officially disbanded in June 2015. Simultaneously, the
political landscape in Malaysia has experienced an unprecedented change. As mentioned
in the last section, the opposition comprises two camps: (a) the Malay-Muslim dissidents;
(b) the social democrats. In the modern political history of Malaysia, there was never a
time when dissidents from the Malay and Muslim compartment had the power like the
pre-2018 GE14 era. The three Malay and Muslim parties – PAS, BERSATU, and
AMANAH – became the UMNO’s direct threat in the Malay rural constituencies. While
the reformasi narrative incorporated with the BERSIH and HINDRAF social activism for
nearly a decade, the mixed constituencies in urban areas were also favouring KEADILAN
and DAP instead of the Barisan Nasional. Hence, Mahathir decided to collaborate with
his deadly foe, Anwar Ibrahim, after two decades of antagonism in light of these political
dynamics. The Mahathir’s petition for Anwar’s royal pardon was approved by Yang diPertuan Agong soon after the two of them reached an agreement. Before the reconciliation,
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Pakatan Rakyat was reformed into Pakatan Harapan in September 2015 upon the
departure of PAS and the inauguration of AMANAH, and the latter remained in Pakatan
Harapan. Joining forces with Mahathir-led BERSATU in 2017, Pakatan Harapan became
an alliance comprising of four parties: the Anwar-led KEADILAN, the Chinesedominated DAP, the Muslim-based AMANAH, and the Malay-based BERSATU.
Mahathir, surprisingly, was agreed to be the opposition leader to contest against UMNOBN, the party he worked for almost the entire life, in the 2018 GE14.
With Mahathir at the helm and Anwar returning to the political arena, many felt
that Pakatan Harapan was much more promising than Barisan Nasional. Parties in Pakatan
Harapan did not subscribe to the same set of ideology, but their aims, strategies, and
enemies were quite sound. KEADILAN and DAP remained at the non-Malay and mixed
constituencies; AMANAH contested the Muslim-based constituencies; BERSATU
challenged the UMNO base; the East Malaysia allies Parti Warisan Sabah (WARISAN,
Sabah Heritage Party) and others defended constituencies in Sabah and Sarawak against
UMNO. Arguably, the most game-changing player in the 2018 GE14 was Mahathir and
his BERSATU. Neither Mahathir nor the conservative Malays were ready to move away
from race-based politics. Thereby, BERSATU allowed them to have an alternative for
UMNO without sacrificing their preference for ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy). The
second major factor should attribute to the influence of PAS and the emergence of
AMANAH. AMANAH was an ideological alternative for PAS, and its strategy was
similar to BERSATU for UMNO; while PAS also significantly disrupted the UMNO’s
base on the east coast of the peninsula. In addition to the political competition between
Pakatan Harapan and Barisan Nasional, Najib’s policies and misconducts were highly
responsible for the forthcoming Election result. Except for the 1MDB scandal, Najib
implemented the unwanted goods and services tax (GST) in 2015, directly affecting many
livelihoods. In a nutshell, the Pakatan Harapan successful electoral strategy, the
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ineffective UMNO’s race card, and the unpopular Najib’s leadership were three of many
factors which led to the fall of Barisan Nasional in the 2018 GE14.
The 2018 GE14 terminated the UMNO-led BN’s sixty-one-year rule in Malaysia
and handed over the administration to the Mahathir-led PH. However, the Barisan
Nasional’s downfall resulted from several corruptions and misdeeds conducted by Najib,
rather than an ideological swing from Barisan Nasional to Pakatan Harapan. Hence, the
immediate task of the Pakatan Harapan at the helm was to formulate an ideological fabric
for different component parties. Yet, they had a fundamental disjuncture on advancing
ethnic and religious equality. Meanwhile, Barisan Nasional and PAS formed an
opposition alliance named Muafakat Nasional (MN, National Concord) in September
2019. It voiced against the government on declining Malay-Muslim rights in Malaysia
and proposed integrating all the Malay-Muslim parties to replace Pakatan Harapan’s
government. Nonetheless, Mahathir and BERSATU, as the leader and the major party of
PH, did not reject the proposal of Muafakat Nasional and publicly claimed support to a
larger Malay unity in the Malay Dignity Congress in October 2019. On 24 February 2020,
Mahathir walked away from his premiership all of a sudden. Following Mahathir’s
resignation, BERSATU withdrew from Pakatan Harapan at once and invited eleven
KEADILAN’s lawmakers to join their maneuvering. The infamous episode concluded
with BERSATU’s Party President Muhyiddin Yassin swearing in as the eighth Prime
Minister of Malaysia with BERSATU, BN, and PAS support. Eventually, these parties
formed a ruling coalition named Perikatan Nasional (PN, National Alliance) under
Muhyiddin’s leadership, while Pakatan Harapan ended its rule for merely twenty-one
months.
The decline of UMNO-BN’s government under Najib’s leadership was attributed
to the heated social discontentment over the electoral manipulation, the awareness for the
interest of ethnic minorities, the Najib’s corruption and misdeed, the economic recession
and other livelihood issues. Pakatan Harapan managed to associate the dissenting voices
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against the UMNO-BN’s government in the GE14 and ended their sixty-one-year rule in
Malaysia. However, the race-based mindset and the elite cronyism are still deeply rooted
in the parliament. This causes the political instability in Malaysia since Pakatan Harapan
at the helm.
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CHAPTER 3
REFORMASI AT A CROSSROADS

Pakatan Harapan made bold promises on socio-economic and institutional reform in
several campaigns before the Election and had those manifesto printed in a pamphlet
named Buku Harapan [3]. In addition, Mahathir inaugurated a national blueprint, titled
Shared Prosperity Vision 2030, during the first anniversary of Pakatan Harapan’s
government in May 2019, which aimed to aid the Bumiputera and B40 families to
overcome their financial difficulties [4]. Though many commitments have made, the
public failed to see the economic benefits after one year of Pakatan Harapan in Putrajaya.
Scholars argue it was due to Pakatan Harapan being drawn to the institutional reform more
than the actual bread-and-butter issues; but, most people were struggling to cope with the
increasing cost of living. (Saiful Wan Jan 2020, p. 22) In the annual ceremony, the
government claimed that 60 per cent of their promises had been materialized within a year
in the office, but the public failed to feel the difference, if not worse, compared to the
times under the rule of Barisan Nasional.
Furthermore, Pakatan Harapan failed to address the Malay insecurity and anxiety
after the Election. Noteworthy, Pakatan Harapan won the Election only by a slim margin.
Despite many deemed the electoral result as a Malay Tsunami because the rural Malay
voters were captured by BERSATU and AMANAH, which delivered the success of
Pakatan Harapan. However, scholars indicated that it was a Green Tsunami instead
because UMNO voters who lost faith in Najib were shown casting their vote to PAS rather
than BERSATU [5]. (Hazis 2018, p. 273) To look closely at these two camps of Malay
parties, BERSATU and AMANAH won 23 seats while UMNO and PAS won 72 seats,
which means most Malay populations still worried that the Malay interest would be
compromised under the leadership of Pakatan Harapan. Therefore, UMNO in the
opposition camp provoked the Malay sentiment by criticizing policies made by the
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government, such as the appointment of Lim Guan Eng as Minister of Finance and the
ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD).
Another never-ending dispute within Pakatan Harapan was the premiership
succession issue. Mahathir promised to hand over to Anwar in not more than two years
after the GE14, but he appeared reluctant to make a clear statement and date to finish the
transition. Many deemed Mahathir had another candidate for the next Prime Minister
instead of Anwar. Meanwhile, KEADILAN’s deputy president Azmin Ali and his faction
discontented with Anwar’s leadership and frequently challenged Anwar’s statement and
position since late 2019. Pakatan Harapan seemed to have a hard time reaching a
consensus on the leadership issue. Additionally, BERSATU and Mahathir openly express
their interest in the UMNO-PAS’s proposal of the broad Malay unity. These signs have
foreseen the collapse of Pakatan Harapan as early as November 2019, three months before
the Sheraton move. According to a current lawmaker in BERSATU, Mahathir had the
plan to ditch Anwar and Pakatan Harapan to form a Malay-led government by joining
hand with UMNO and PAS, notwithstanding that he publicly rejected the UMNO’s
corrupted leaders. (ibid, pp. 32-36) All these events led to the political saga in February
2020 and ended with the Muhyiddin-led PN replacing the Pakatan Harapan in Putrajaya.
In short, the collapse of Pakatan Harapan attributed to three causes: (a) failure to
make a quick improvement in national economy and livelihood; (b) failure to address the
Malay anxiety and discontentment; and (c) failure to sort out the internal conflicts; among
them were the third reason which is the most detrimental and caused its downfall in less
than one term. Differences within Pakatan Harapan was fully aware since the beginning.
Nonetheless, they set aside their differences in order to topple the kleptocrats and restore
a clean government to Malaysian. In order words, the foundation of Pakatan Harapan was
not their ideology or philosophy but their enemies. Therefore, they ought to sort out the
ideological dilemma after taking over the federal power and enforcing legal charge on
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Najib and his cronies. However, Pakatan Harapan seemed not to have a consensus on its
political agenda, albeit many visions have made.
Some background of the four component parties is needed to make sense of the
internal dynamics within the coalition. KEADILAN has a rather diverse membership
coming from all races and classes. Though members of KEADILAN mostly subscribe to
social democracy but it does not have a definite political ideology. The loyalty to the
reformasi spirit and the Anwar’s leadership is the common fabric that unites them as a
political sect. DAP, formed in 1965, is the oldest party in Pakatan Harapan. After
Singapore left Malaysia, the People’s Action Party (PAP) leaders who remained in
Malaysia established DAP to continue their struggle towards a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’.
(Chew 1980, pp. 1-3) Since its historical link with the PAP in Singapore and the Chinese
domination, the Malays are reluctant to cast their vote for them. AMANAH’s political
ideology is progressive Islamism, which separates them from PAS that demands
establishing Islamic State and implementing the Syariah law. Its members practise Islam
in a more progressive, democratic, liberal and subtle way. Last but not least, BERSATU
subscribes to Malay nationalism, which has no different from UMNO. It intends to replace
UMNO and functions as the Malay core in the new coalition.
Compared to Barisan Nasional, the power distribution among parties in Pakatan
Harapan was equal and thus resulted in the lack of a clear coalition leader. Out of 222
parliamentary seats in the GE14, Pakatan Harapan won 113 seats. Among them,
KEADILAN contributed 50 seats; DAP contributed 42 seats; AMANAH and BERSATU
contributed 18 and 11 seats, respectively. As the data showed, none of the parties had half
of the total seats to assert absolute influence over the coalition. On the bright side, the
absence of a dominant party can better the check-and-balance system. Coalition members
could have rational debates focusing on policies and toward a more mature and healthy
idea-based political culture, but it has disadvantages, too. Mahathir-led BERSATU has a
strong UMNO background that highly subscribes to race-based politics, while the other
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parties advocate building a nation toward more social equity. This fundamental difference
was attributed to the lack of a shared coalition ideology and philosophy. Meanwhile, both
sides have no power to oust each other; otherwise, the coalition will collapse. BERSATU
and Mahathir concerned that Anwar might enhance his reformasi agenda after his
succession. Therefore, they started to seek collaboration outside the party and eventually
led to the downfall of the Pakatan Harapan government.
There were plenty of opposition coalitions disbanded within one or two terms as
parties in the coalition failed to negotiate a sustainable ideological foundation and had no
common interest to strive after. The APU-GR coalition contested in 1990 and 1994. The
Barisan Alternatif contested in 1999 and 2004. The Pakatan Rakyat contested in 2008 and
2013. Therefore, except for putting effort in seeking socioeconomic and institutional
reform, Pakatan Harapan need to architect an alternative discourse to counter the UMNOBN race-based narrative. To sum up, the main reason which led to the fall of Pakatan
Harapan was its failure to establish a political discourse other than the traditional UMNOled BN’s race-based ideology.
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PART II
PERSPECTIVES OF THE BANGSA NARRATIVE
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CHAPTER 4
THE INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN NATION AND RACE

Malaysia is a modern concept which arose in 1963 after the peninsular Malaya merged
with North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore as a nation. Hence, Tunku's administration's
immediate challenge was to forge a new national identity and character. Malaysia was a
racially polarized society as the Malay privilege was upheld after independence, which
rendered the non-Malays living under threat. Immediately upon the proposal of Malaysia
was realized, a similar concern was invoked among the Malay communities – merging
with a Chinese-populated port like Singapore might jeopardize the Malay interest and
constitutional right. This unsolved problem led to Singapore's departure approximately
two years later and a series of social unrest happened in 1969. Thereafter, race becomes
the first and foremost issue to deal with for manufacturing a national identity.
Nation was an abstract idea to Malaysian under the Tunku’s administration. The
Tunku-led Alliance engendered a concrete picture for Malaysians to imagine Malaysia as
a nation – a Malay-Chinese-Indian partnership headed by a Malay leadership. The state
reinforced this race-based national imagination through introducing a corresponding set
of values, historical narrative, culture, and policies. Therefore, Malaysian history always
begins with the Malacca Sultanate instead of the Srivijaya empire, as the state discourse
needs a Malay-Muslim ancestor to legitimize its script, and it renders the pre-Malacca era
a distant and irrelevant past for Malaysian. This narrative entitles the Malays to be owners
and rulers of the land, while the non-Malays are latecomers. Ironically, the idea of nation
did not bring unity to Malaysian immediately but further consolidate their race
consciousness and division.
The emergence of race-based discourse dates back to the colonization era. Under
the British rule, the ethnic relationship underwent a structural transformation. With the
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establishment of the Pangkor Agreement in 1874, the British took control of three Malay
states, as the British advisors and other investors believed that a full-range governance
could maximize the profit from the tin and rubber plantation. While the local Malays did
not make a cheap labor force, the British recruited the Chinese and the Indian immigrant
to work in the plantations and the cities. On the other hand, the Malay political right was
consent by the British. As there was a clear-cut economic and political role for the Malays
and the non-Malays, the racial differences were increasingly emphasized, and the effort
of acculturation for centuries was immediately disrupted.
The colonial experience under the British administration reshaped the concept of
race in the Malay states. Before the mid-nineteenth century, the Malay Archipelago was
already a cultural crossroad intertwined with different ethnic and civilization. There were
conflicts and collaboration among the race communities, but all were inhabiting a shared
cultural sphere. In the 1870s, the modern concept of race was manufactured in order to
maintain the direct colonial rule and the economic interest. The division was intensified
in the twentieth century. The British rulers incorporated with the Malay aristocracies in
politics and the Chinese entrepreneurs in cities. Therefore, the Malay nationalism arose
in the 1930s contained a democratic appeal but also a racist nature. It accused the Malay
sultan of betraying his rakyat (people), and rejected the Chinese and the Indian as part of
their Bangsa Melayu (Malay race).
The racial antagonism was further escalated under the Japanese Occupation as the
Army employed a different treatment towards the Chinese and non-Chinese. Before the
invasion, the Japanese diplomat had been supporting the local nationalist movement like
Kesatuan Melayu Muda the Malay nationalist organization and Indian Independence
League the Indian nationalist organization. But, the Chinese was hard to collaborate with
as the China-Japan rivalry in the late 1930s sparked a strong hostility between Chinese
and Japanese. After the Occupation, the Japanese took revenge on the Chinese, while the
communists continued to combat the Army in the remote areas. The communist power

30

remained a threat for the British and the Malays after the War ended, and it resulted in the
declaration of Emergency from 1948 to 1960. Although the communist influence had
withdrawn from Malaya/Malaysia since the Tunku’s administration, it became an image
associated with the Chinese in Malaysia until now.
Decolonization in the postwar Malaya has a more significant influence in shaping
the modern concept of race. In 1946, the British combined all nine Malay states and the
Strait Settlements of Malacca and Penang under one Malayan Union. The Union proposal
received a wide dissatisfaction among the Malay communities, because it offered equal
citizenship to all residents in Malaya. The British abandoned Malayan Union and adopted
Federation of Malaya in 1948. The Federation constitution enforced more restriction to
the non-Malay citizenship, and reinforced the status of Malay tradition. While the Malay
nationalist party, United Malays National Organization (UMNO), played the most crucial
role in facilitating the realization of Federation of Malaya. Thereupon, UMNO became an
active political party collaborating with the British to advance the independence.
The race-based parties started to flourish in the 1950s like the Malayan Chinese
Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). Inculcating the British idea
of multiracial cooperation, UMNO invited MCA and MIC to establish a race-based
political coalition, the Alliance, in 1952. It claimed a landslide victory in the first General
Election three years later. Thereafter, the UMNO-led Alliance became a prototype of
interethnic political collaboration. The Alliance’s formula, a Malay leadership in
collaboration of the other races, demonstrated an example for the Malayan/Malaysian
nationalism. But, it did not resolve the racial antagonism. Instead, it took racism to a
national level in a subtle way. The British imperialist racial ideology was not diminished
but internalized into the UMNO race-based narrative. This race-based narrative infiltrated
the Malaysian culture and society from the politics down to all aspects of their quotidian
life.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ORIGIN OF BANGSA

The Malay sociopolitical culture is embedded in the non-Malay communities as much as
in the Malay communities in modern Malaya and Malaysia, because it intervenes the life
of other ethnicities, and thus invokes their counteraction. Under such a circumstance, the
non-Malays tend to regard Malayness as an object of confrontation or collaboration to
fixate their imagined community in defense of the Malay hegemony. Hence, we shall
understand the formation and transformation of the non-Malay historical subjectivities as
a series of reactions and counteractions to their Malay counterpart. In other words, the
obsession of featuring the Chineseness and the Indianness in the historical narrative of
Malayan/Malaysian Chinese and Indian is not innocently for the sake of its tradition, but
an effort to demonstrate their non-Malayness, in order to unfold a discursive space to
resist the shadow of Malayness. The competition between the Malayness and the nonMalayness resurfaces itself occasionally in every sociopolitical events since the
immediate postwar period; therefore, the anxieties among the non-Malay communities
also ranged from time to time. Notably, we shall not discount these anxieties as a passive
reflection to sociopolitical turmoil; on the contrary, there are significant outputs for the
reconstruction of the non-Malay sociopolitical discourse.
This thesis initiates on the belief that bangsa, a Malay word carrying multiple
denotations of race, ethnicity, people, tribe, state, nation, community, and nationality, is
a foundational notion in the formation of Malay sociopolitical culture. By 1946 in the
immediate postwar Malaya, the British proposal of the Malayan Union compelled both
the Malay conservatives and radicals to reevaluate and reinterpret the orthodox idea of
bangsa Melayu which originally bears foci on the Malay rajas and the Malay lands. Under
the influence of nationalism and democratism, the foci of bangsa Melayu maneuvers from
rulers and royals to leaders and communities; however, the bangsa Melayu still excludes
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the non-Malays from becoming a Malayan or part of the bangsa. Almost half a century
later, in the early 1990s, the fourth Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad officially
introduced the idea of bangsa Malaysia to advance the national unity; by then, the nonMalays started becoming part of the bangsa if not an authentic Malaysian.
As stated above, the Malay word, bangsa, can mean race, ethnicity, people, tribe,
state, nation, community, and nationality simultaneously; however, bangsa does not
always carry as many meanings as in the modern age. Back in the precolonial era, bangsa
simply means a group of people living under a Malay kingdom, such as Srivijaya empire
and Malacca Sultanate; later in the colonial era, bangsa still mainly denotes people and
community; but the arrival of the Japanese brings a critical change to the convention of
Malay sociopolitical culture. For the convenience of administration, the Japanese
establish a political entity by merging all the Malay states with the Strait Settlements; as
a result, the respective Malay sultanate power declines, meanwhile a shared racial
consciousness among the Malay state awakes. After the War ended, the British proposes
to establish an all-embracing Malayan Union by endowing citizenship to all races. Along
with the rise of Malay racial consciousness, and the inclined influence of the non-Malay
communities, the Malays determine to reclaim their Malay bangsa (nation). It is when the
idea of state, nation, nationality, and citizenship infiltrates the Malay word bangsa.
The denotation of bangsa is not fixed. Bangsa adjusts itself in accordance with
the external and internal influences for the Malay communities. Due to its fluidity, we
shall impose a binary-relation to the framework of interpretation for bangsa. In a context
of tribalism, the Malay sultanates are separate bangsa which worships their respective
rajas. In a context of racialism, the Malay race is a united bangsa which opposes other
races in its state. In the context of nationalism, the Malayan/Malaysian is an allied bangsa
which demands liberation from the British rulers. In a context of democratic reformation,
the Malay people are an allied integrated bangsa which questions the legitimacy of the
Malay royals and aristocrats. In short, regardless of its ambiguity, it occurs that unity is
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the most fundamental element of the word bangsa; hence, in the later writings, I will
regard the foundation of bangsa as unity if not communal solidarity.
The idea of bangsa Melayu is raised in the early twentieth century and reaches its
height after the War ended. Bangsa Melayu implies that the Malay rights and the Malay
lands solely belong to the Malay people instead of the rajas, and the Malay race instead
of the Chinese and Indian lodgers. Its exclusiveness intensifies the class tension between
the aristocrats and the people, the social tension between the conservatives and the radicals,
and the racial tension between the Malays and the non-Malays. These tensions later create
a new face of Malayan/Malaysian sociopolitical culture. Firstly, on the constitutional level,
the bangsa Melayu legitimates the Malay political supremacy and leads to race-based
politics; secondly, on the sociocultural aspects, the anxieties of the non-Malays always
anchor to the structural changes of the implication of bangsa.
The mid-1940s and the early 1990s are two historic moments when the idea of
bangsa goes through a series of critical reassessment. First of all, during the mid-1940s
aftermath, both the Malay conservatives and radicals call for reform for the Malay
communities. Onn Jaafar, later became the founding father of the UMNO, advocates that
the object of loyalty shall orient to the bangsa Melayu instead of their respective sultan.
Secondly, in the early 1990s, Mahathir Mohamad, the fourth and seventh prime minister
of Malaysia, outlines a vision that aimed to become a fully developed nation within three
decades; more importantly, he wants to form a united bangsa Malaysia. Both Onn’s
bangsa Melayu or Mahathir’s bangsa Malaysia target to confront a larger conflict by
using ethnic if not communal solidarity as a means. For Onn, bangsa Melayu is a new
conceptual space where the boundaries among various Malay settlements could be
shattered, then redirects their spearhead to the Malay feudalism. For Mahathir, bangsa
Malaysia is an attempt to invent a new sense of ethnicity, the Malaysian, to cancel out the
ethnic differences between the Malays and the non-Malays, so that the nation could
proceed as a unity in the age of globalization. The emergence of bangsa Melayu and
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bangsa Malaysia leaves us two immediate questions: (a) how is Malayness manifested
within the bangsa Melayu; and (b) how is Malayanness/Malaysianness manifested within
the bangsa Malaysia.
Firstly, the Malay sociopolitical culture defines Malayness. Being practiced for
centuries in the Malay Archipelago, also known as Nusantara, there are two essential
beliefs revolving around the political life of Malay communities: (a) tanah Melayu; and
(b) bumiputra. Tanah Melayu means lands of the Malay; it claims that the peninsular
Malaya is the property of the Malay race because the peninsular Malaya is within the
domain of the Nusantara. Bumiputra means sons of the soil; it insists that the Malay race
shall be endowed a unique position and privileges because they are born in and thus the
owner of tanah Melayu. The Malayness manifests through tanah Melayu and bumiputra.
Nonetheless, the Malayness has made concessions with the British rulers in exchange for
Independence. Also, the Malayness tries to maintain the interest of Malay race; in the
meantime, it finds a place for the non-Malays. All these compromises have been made for
the nationhood to take the Malayness into another composition with Malaysianness.
Secondly, the Malay-Chinese-Indian multiracial composition, which develops
during the twentieth century, defines the idea of Malayanness/Malaysianness. The idea of
Malayanness/Malaysianness creates a more inclusive space to accommodate all races into
one imagined community called Malaya/Malaysia. In this process, the national or regional
unity gradually interrupts the Malay racial solidarity. However, on the contrary to the
belief that the Malayanness/Malaysianness is to eliminate the racial identity, the
Malayanness/Malaysianness makes room for all Malayness, Chineseness, and Indianness.
The precondition is that the Malayanness/Malaysianness is an embracing nationality in
which the Malayness is its foundation. Drawing back to the pre-independent era when the
consciousness of Malayan and Malaysian first comes on stage, Wang Gung-wu says that
the ‘Malayan nationalism consists of two component parts: a nucleus of Malay
nationalism enclosed by the idea of Malay-Chinese-Indian partnership’ (Wang 1981, p.
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205). Furthermore, according to the note from Tim Harper on the speech of Tunku Abdul
Rahman (the first prime minister of Malaya/Malaysia), it writes ‘in 1951 Tunku Abdul
Rahman had asked rhetorically who the Malayan were: his answer was that there could
be a Malayan nation, but the Malay bangsa [race/nation] would exist as a distinct core
within it’ (Harper 1999, p. 350). The unfinished project of Malayan nationalism later
continues as the Malaysian nationalism in 1963 with the merging of north Borneo and
Singapore and deteriorates since 1965 after Singapore’s departure. After decades of
contestation on the legitimacy of Malay supremacies, Malaysians begin to agree on the
policy of bumiputra and accept the Malay political and constitutional special position to
a certain extent. However, this nucleus of Malayness within the Malaysianness varies
occasionally, and the variation of the state of Malayness would result in their non-Malay
counterparts. Hence, how bangsa is articulated will affect the relation of different
components within the Malaysianness. Conceptualizing bangsa is, thus, not a luxury but
a necessity.
As noted above, the foundation of bangsa is unity or communal solidarity, but the
precise meaning of bangsa will vary in accordance with its respective context. Several
terms that are closely related to bangsa need to be carefully examined. These terms can
be divided into two groups: (a) the interchangeable words for bangsa; and (b) the words
that branched from bangsa:
a-i) kaum refers to race, while bangsa refers to ethnic;
a-ii) keturunan refers to descendant, while bangsa refers to birthplace;
a-iii) negara refers to country, while bangsa refers to nation;
a-iv) rakyat refers to people, while bangsa refers to nationals;
a-v) suku refers to tribe, while bangsa refers to community;
a-vi) warganegara refers to citizenship, while bangsa refers to nationality;
b-i) bangsawan refers to aristocrat, while bangsa refers to civilian; and
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b-ii) kebangsaan refers to national, while bangsa refers to racial.
Accordingly, both bangsa and kaum can mean race, but one’s bangsa is decided by his or
her cultural traits – more like ethnic, while one’s kaum is decided by his or her physical
appearance. Secondly, both bangsa and keturunan can mean descendant, but bangsa
indicates one’s birthplace, while keturunan indicates one’s origin. Thirdly, both bangsa
and negara can mean country, but bangsa is defined in terms of its socio-politico-cultural
entity, while negara is defined in terms of its geographical boundaries. Fourthly, both
bangsa and rakyat can mean people, but bangsa refers to the people comes from a certain
nation, while rakyat refers to the ordinary people living inside a nation vis-à-vis the rajas
and royals. Fifthly, both bangsa and suku can mean tribe, but bangsa is a general term to
mean community, while suku has a restricted usage to mean a certain Malay kampung or
Malay tribalism. Sixthly, both bangsa and warganegara means citizenship, but bangsa
assumes a full set of commitments and emotive attached with the nationality, while
warganegara simply means the residential right in a country. Lastly, the bangsawan and
bangsa, which mean aristocrat and civilian respectively, add in a class dimension; while
the kebangsaan and bangsa, which mean national and racial respectively, invite an ethnic
dimension. Given the above, the meaning of bangsa is enriched and evolved along with
the historical development in the Malay socio-political culture, and vice versa. In this
sense, bangsa is arguably the base-entity of Malay and Malaysian culture.3 Studying the
interpretation of the idea of bangsa is, therefore, not only crucial for rethinking the
Malaysian history, but also helpful for relocating the emotional aspects aroused in the
moments of ideological changes, given the fact that it is revolved around the entire
formation of the historical subjectivity of Malaysian.
Integration is an anticipated outcome for making a bangsa. Yet, the process of
manufacturing an integrated bangsa is indeed problematic because we need to question
what is the centrifugal elements of the bangsa in the first place. Next, we shall continue
to find out what policies are implemented in order to promote this idea of bangsa. By
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adopting this idea of bangsa, we can immediately identify support and opposition from
different communities, then we might proceed to ask what is the nature and motives of
these reactions and counteractions. After deconstructed the bangsa, we shall finally see
how the bangsa becomes a recurring motif in the historical and political development in
Malaysia. In the following paragraphs, I will first compare the two prominent concepts of
bangsa: the bangsa Melayu and the bangsa Malaysia.
During the 1940s, bangsa Melayu is a claim for the Malay sovereignty and the
people’s sovereignty. The belief of bangsa Melayu leads to the formation of the
Federation of Malaya in 1948 that comprised of all states in peninsular Malaya. On the
one hand, bangsa Melayu embraces the constitutional monarch to ensure the Malay
people’s mandate is prioritized; on the other hand, bangsa Melayu legitimizes the Malay
special position in peninsular Malay by distinguishing the bangsa Melayu from the
bangsa-bangsa asing (foreign races). Followed by the implementation of the Federation
of Malaya, the non-Malays have no choice but to accept that they are conferred only with
an inferior rank. Therefore, the non-Malays endeavor to work on their inherited traditional
and cultural assets, in order to create a discursive space fighting against the overwhelming
Malay hegemony.
Envisaging in the 1990s, bangsa Malaysia is a claim for the national unity and
the economic prosperity. Bangsa Malaysia is still an initiative has yet to fully materialized.
In 1991, Mahathir proposes the Vision 2020, and aims to forge a full partnership between
the Malays and the non-Malays, particularly in the economic area. Instead of naively
believing in multiracial harmony, this project envisions a stable growth of Malay middleclass in order to balance the social status between Malays and Chinese. Nonetheless, the
bangsa Malaysia successfully creates a strong sentimental appeal because it appears as
an inclusive idea of national integrity regardless of races. In fact, bangsa Malaysia still
remains the nucleus of Malayness as a precondition of multiethnic integration since it
wants to strengthen the interracial bond by not compromising the Malay supremacy. The
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occurrence of bangsa Malaysia signifies the discursive contestation between the Malays
and the non-Malays has escalated to an ideological combat where the Malayness and the
non-Malayness are forced into a new battleground called the Malaysianness.
We shall capture the pattern of the interracial relation in Malaysia by picturing
the changes of the conceptual framework of the bangsa. In other words, understanding
the nature of bangsa can assist us to make sense of how Malayan/Malaysian live under
the Malay nationalism and the Malayan/Malaysian nationalism.
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CHAPTER 6
FROM BANGSA MELAYU TO BANGSA MALAYSIA

In the ancient Malay sociopolitical culture, it is believed that God confers the sovereignty
power to the rulers, i.e., the rajas or sultans. (Brown 1970, p. 16) By this sacred
endowment, the rulers would obtain a daulat (holy aura), which distinguished his or her
majesty from the rest of the subjects. With this mandate, the rulers shall submit themselves
to God, and all subjects shall obey their ruler unconditionally; otherwise, it would be
considered as committing derhaka (treason). According to this belief, the sociopolitical
life of the early Malay civilization always revolves around a supreme ruler, and the ruler
becomes an ultimate point of reference for a civilization. This stable ruler-subject relation
is built upon a system of kerajaan – ‘being in a state of having a raja’ (Milner 1982: pp.
8-9), and it infiltrates into every aspect of the ordinary life of the Malay community. After
several centuries-long in cultivating this raja-centric political system, the people started
to form a sense of community by identifying themselves as rakyat (people) living under
a certain kerajaan, and this raja-rakyat formulation gradually becomes a prerequisite
factor in forming a sociopolitical entity. By and large, the ruler-subject and the raja-rakyat
composition shapes the early sense of bangsa in the Malay world. Channeling the loyalty
to kerajaan, in other words, is the early form of building communal solidarity in the Malay
society. For instance, during the Srivijaya empire, the Majapahit empire, the Melaka
empire, and the Malay sultanates emerging since the twelfth century, kerajaan functions
as a nucleus to unite the discrete Malay communities.
Arrived at an agreement between the Malay rulers and the British governors by
signing the Treaty of Federation in 1896, the peninsular Malaya is divided into three
components: (a) the Straits Settlements of Singapore, Melaka, and Penang under the direct
British control; (b) the Federated Malay States of Selangor, Pahang, Perak, and Negeri
Sembilan which enjoyed autonomy only in local affairs; and (c) the Unfederated Malay
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States of Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Terengganu, which enjoyed greater
autonomy. Accompanied with the arrival of nationalism in Southeast Asia in the early
twentieth century, the Malay intellectuals begin to voice their dissatisfaction towards the
rajas, royals, and the kerajaan on surrendering the political sovereignty of the Malay lands.
According to Ariffin Omar’s account on the rise of nationalism in Malaya, he stated that
Munshi Abdullah was one of the Malay intellectuals who criticize the kerajaan.

[Munshi Abdullah] felt that indolence or negligence was not the cause of Malay
backwardness: as long as people could derive benefits such as satisfaction and
profits from their work, they would work. But if the people lived in perpetual fear
of the persecution and greed of the ruler and the nobility, society would be poor
and backward. If what they earned was seized by the ruling elite, it was pointless
to be industrious for they would not enjoy the fruits of their labor. (Omar 2015,
pp. 17-18)
Meanwhile, the establishment of Federated and Unfederated Malay States, on the one
hand, weakens the function of kerajaan, because negeri (state) as a political unit has
compromised for the greater unit of federation; on the other hand, the surrender of the
political power of the four Federated Malay States renders their rajas and kerajaan the
puppets of British. Under this circumstance, the Malay bangsa, which at first orients
towards kerajaan, gradually turns its foci to the prominent Malay leaders. In other words,
the ruler-subject and raja-rakyat relations are no longer stable since the late period of
British rule, and it signify the awaken of Malay masses.
During the Hindu-Buddhist era in the Malay world, race is not a ubiquitous notion
that carries political implications; instead, people tend to use territory and sovereignty to
separate themselves from others. The arrival of Islam in Southeast Asia since the twelfth
century gives rise to racial consciousness. Notably, while the Melaka sultanates, the center
of Islamization in Asia, associate the Malays with Muslims and defined Melayu as people
who practice Islam and speak Malay, a strong religious and political connotation began
to develop in the Malay identity (Reid 2004, p. 7). This Malay-Muslim bilateral
identification later penetrates the idea of bangsa as the kerajaan in decline, and the
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growing menace from the bangsa-bangsa asing (foreign races), in particular, Chinese and
Indians. The tripartite relation of Malay-Chinese-Indian exists in the peninsular Malaya
since the British implementation of the divide-and-rule system in the early nineteenth
century: the elite Malay in the civil servant sector, the elite Chinese in the business sector,
the elite Indian in the police force; the rural Malay in the agriculture and aquaculture, the
rural Chinese in the mining industry, the rural Indian in the plantation. When the British
proposal of the Malayan Union is put forward after the war, the racial tension quickly
intensifies; also, the Malay nationalism reaches its height.
By integrated the Federated and Unfederated Malay States altogether with the
Strait Settlements, except Singapore, in 1946, the British ideal of the Malayan Union is to
grant all the residents, regardless of race and class, in the peninsular Malaya equal rights
and citizenship. More significantly, the British aims to construct a sense of Malayanness
and lead the Malayans to advance the Independence project (Omar 2015, p. 54). The
Malay rulers accept the Union plan though reluctantly, while the Malay society is unhappy
with their decision without obtaining the consent from the people. Without lasted for twoyear-long, under the massive pressure of the call for anti-colonialist, anti-royalist, and
anti-foreigner from the Malay organization, the British agree to withdraw the Union plan
and replace with the Federation plan, i.e., Federation of Malaya. The Federation plan,
which remains its objective of conferring equal rights and citizenship that promised before,
proposes that the Malays, and other bumiputra, shall enjoy a special position that more
privilege than the bangsa-bangsa asing (ibid, p. 129). Meanwhile, the idea of
Malayanness is also rejected together with the Malayan Union because the Malay accuses
that the idea of Malayan is a pure invention of colonialism. The transition from the Union
plan to the Federation plan, on the one hand, further fixates the imagined community of
bangsa Melayu vis-à-vis the kerajaan and the bangsa-bangsa asing, on the other hand,
the Malay nationalism acquires its legitimacy to monopolize the racial discourse in
Malaya (later Malaysia).
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Since the massive importation of foreign labor from China and India in the early
twentieth century, the population and the ethnic diversity in the peninsular Malaya is
growing rapidly. Fifty-six-year-time from 1911 to 1957, the population goes through
almost a threefold increase from 2.3 million to 6.3 million, while the ethnic composition
of three major races – Malay, Chinese, and Indian – reaches the balance of 49%, 36.6%,
and 11.5% by the year of Independence. (Khoo 2005, pp. 2-4) These data signify that a
plural society like Malaya/Malaysia depends very much on the interethnic collaboration;
in fact, according to Saravanamuthu, Malaysia showcases ways of ethnic power sharing
and coalition politics to the world (Saravanamuthu 2016, p. 3). Emerging immediately
after the implementation of the Federation plan, the prototype of Malaysian politics comes
into existence in the 1955 General Election. Dato Onn Jaafar, the founder of the Malaybased UMNO (United Malays National Organization), decides to withdraw from his party
to establish a multiracial IMP (Independence of Malaya Party); while Onn’s successor,
Tunku Abdul Rahman, later becomes the first Prime Minister of Malaya/Malaysia, seeks
collaboration with the Chinese-based MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association) and the
Indian-based MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) to form the Alliance Party to confront the
IMP in the 1955 General Election. Consequently, the race-based UMNO-led Alliance
defeats the multiracial IMP. (Lee 2007, pp. 491 - 495) Although it implies that the
interracial equality would not be materialized in Malaya/Malaysia for a short term, but it
also lays bare a new picture of interracial collaboration – the Alliance model. The Alliance
model suggests that the Malay nationalism precedes the Malayan/Malaysian nationalism.
In other words, the Malay-Chinese-Indian comradeship presumes mutual respect for the
Malay privilege. The opposition between bangsa Melayu and bangsa-bangsa asing,
therefore, gradually results in the accommodation of bangsa-bangsa asing into a national
partnership by surrounding them with a core of bangsa Malayu.
Given that the allegedly Malay privileges have only provided little concession for
the Malays and yet trigger strong disaffection among the non-Malay communities, the
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inter-racial rivalries continue to intensify after the Independence in 1957. In the 1959
General Election, the popular vote for the Alliance Party drops from 81.7% to 51.8% as
compared to the last Election. The politics of accommodation, according to Cheah, of the
Tunku’s regime, fails to please both the Malay and the non-Malay camp. (Cheah 2002, p.
51). Moreover, the formation of Malaysia, by integrating Singapore and North Borneo in
1963, further complicates the inter-racial tension in Malaysia. Although the Tunku’s
regime curbs the influence of PAP (People’s Action Party) of Singapore by playing
gerrymandering; still, the PAP succeeds in mobilizing many non-Malay parties to
participate its “Malaysian Malaysia” campaign to declare a challenge to the special
position of the Malays. Eventually, the Tunku’s regime decides to expel Singapore from
Malaysia, because it threatens the racial harmony among the nationhood. (ibid, p. 101)
Singapore’s departure consolidates the belief that the bangsa Melayu, at its core of
Malaya/Malaysian nationalism, renders unchallengeable. Meanwhile, the Indonesian
nationalists vehemently oppose the formation of Malaysia through the konfrontasi
movement lasted for three years since 1963, as they accuse that the idea of Malaysia is a
neocolonial invention; however, by facing a threat from abroad, an identification for the
nationhood is strengthened. Accompanied by internal and external political turmoil during
the formation of Malaysia, bangsa Melayu carries not only a racial and democratic
implication but also began to develop a national and global connotation.
The most incandescent social concern, after Singapore’s exit and konfrontasi, is
the conflict over the revision of the National Language Act in 1967. Malay language is
the national language of Malaya/Malaysia since Independence; however, the Malay
groups demand that the government shall further implement the Malay language fully as
the national and official language. Syed Nasir, an UMNO member as well as an ultraMalay nationalist, accuses that the Tunku’s policies are favorable to the Chinese education
and ostracize the Malay language, complain that the Chinese culture encroaches the Malay
lands (Vorys 1975, p. 204). Still, Tunku decides to delay the amendment of the National
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Language Act; his decision triggers massive wrath among the Malay communities, while
the non-Malays remain silent. All the piled-up social tension manifests in the 1969
General Election: the Alliance Party wins the Election by a narrow margin with only 74
over 144 seats and 44.3% popular vote. Two-day after the General Election, when the
opposition supporters are still soaking in the joy of victory, the racial riot breaks out all
over the country. Immediately, the Yang di-pertuan Agong declares the national
emergency, then appointed Tun Abdul Razak, later becomes the second Prime Minister
in 1970, to lead the National Operations Council (NOC) to handle the emergent situation
from 1969 to 1971. This riot, also known as the 513 incident, signifies the end of Tunku’s
pluralistic bargaining politics – seeking balance from both the Malays and the non-Malays,
and the beginning of an ultra-Malay regime. The 1970s, therefore, is a period when the
core of bangsa Melayu goes through an enormous expansion, and the Malay-ChineseIndian comradeship is in decline.
In a state of emergency, Tun Abdul Razak is entitled to absolute power, and he
succeeds Tunku as Prime Minister in a few months after the outbreak in 1969. The social
conflicts over the last decade, for Razak, shall attribute to the democratic excesses of the
Tunku’s administration, i.e., overly emphasizes on maintaining the racial equality but
neglects the Malay poverty (Mauzy 1983, p. 24). Hence, the Razak regime seeks to close
the economic gap between the Malays and the non-Malays, as well as the rural and the
urban; also, he tries to find a balance between the state and local government. Under the
Razak’s administration, there are six major implementations which create massive
influence for the contemporary Malaysian society: (a) National Economic Policy (NEP);
(b) National Culture Policy (NCP); (c) National Language Policy; (d) the FELDA rural
development; (e) the formation of Barisan National (BN); and (f) the establishment of
Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. Firstly, NEP is a series of economic restructuring
programs that privilege the Malay enterprises and workforce by enforcing racial quota in
the business sector. Secondly, NCP is an official statement which claims that the
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indigenous Malay culture and Islam should be the foundational elements of the national
culture. Thirdly, all national institutions in civil services and education sector should use
the Malay language as a medium of instruction except English subject. Fourthly, the
Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) launches several projects to resettle the
rural Malay kampung and assist in the development of agriculture economy. Fifthly, by
dismisses the Alliance Party, Razak registers a new coalition – Barisan National (BN),
which comprises not only the old comradeship of UMNO-MCA-MIC but also includes
the other six parties – to represent all social stratum in Malaysia.4 Lastly, the state weakens
the Selangor local government by demarcating Kuala Lumpur – the political and
economic center of Malaysia – as the Federal territory that directly governed by the state.
Apart from this, the Razak’s regime also tries to promote the national ideology by issuing
Rukunegara (National Principles). By and large, these implementations not only placate
the Malays but also manufacture a layer of Malay middle-income class; therefore, the
social and economic status between the Malay and the Chinese are eliminated bit by bit.
From the 1970s onwards, the authoritarian power penetrates deeply into the formation of
bangsa; bangsa, thus, is not only a consensus among the people but also envisioned by
wills of the state and regime.
The Razak administration ends with his sudden death while on medical leave in
London by 1976; immediately, Tun Hussein Onn succeeds as Prime Minister. Later in
1981, Hussein decides to transit his power to Tun Mahathir Mohamad smoothly; while
the inauguration of the Mahathir’s administration marks a new era for Malaysian – an
initial path towards authoritarian-capitalist Malaysia. According to Khoo’s analysis of the
Mahathirist philosophy of governance, the so-called Mahathirism consists of five core
components: nationalism, capitalism, Islam, populism, and authoritarianism. His
nationalism manifests in channeling the hostility of Malaysian towards the neocolonialist
and neoliberalist manipulation of money market; his capitalism is ethnic-centric at heart
but also promotes the collaboration of inter-racial businesses; his Islam focuses on
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improving the work ethics of Muslim instead of the dogmatic principles that lack Muslim
behind; his populism reflects in the ability to mobilize popular support to secure his
premiership for twenty-two-year-long; his authoritarianism is exemplified through his
ruthless action towards his opponents regardless within or outside his party. (Khoo 1995,
p. 7) Similar to the Razak’s administration, the Mahathir’s administration tends to shape
the bangsa according to wills of the state and regime as well; however, the former
achieves through imposing a series of economic and cultural policies, while the latter
utilizes its authoritarian means to further an ideological effect. In Althusserian words,
Razak uses mainly the Repressive State Apparatuses (RSA), while Mahathir exploits both
the RSA and the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA) to intervene in the formation of
bangsa. (Althusser 2008, pp. 100 – 140)
In Mahathir’s opinion, there are three inherent causes keeping the Malay race
behind: (a) the innate nature of Malays; (b) the Chinese economic hegemony; and (c) the
Western economic dominance. Published in 1970, Mahathir’s book The Malay Dilemma
writes that the Malays have yet to develop any sophisticated idea related to properties and
monetary system (Mahathir 1970, pp. 166 – 169); also, it believes that the Chinese are
some ‘predatory immigrants’ (ibid, p. 71) but ‘good businessmen’ (ibid, p. 84) who make
profits through excessively exploiting the Malays. Moreover, Mahathir, rising as an Asian
leader in the 1980s, is a spokesman for the Southeast Asian countries: he warns Malaysian
to look out the Western manipulation of the capitalist market and advocates Malaysian to
learn the work ethic from the East – Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Unlike Razak,
NEP’s under Mahathir reduces the state’s government and encourages private businesses
to incorporate with the government project. During the economic recession in the mid1980s, Mahathir resolutely holds the NEP in abeyance from 1 October 1986 to 31
December 1990 to attract more foreign currencies and investments. Meanwhile, by the
late 1980s, the UMNO also goes through a violent split; still, Mahathir manages to secure
his party leadership and cabinet premiership. By 1991, when Malaysia restores to
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normalcy, Mahathir announced the Vision 2020 (Wawasan 2020) : it proposes that by
2020 Malaysia would become a fully-developed country and a united bangsa Malaysia
free of racial inequality and discrimination. More importantly, apart from his reassertion
of the cliché of the importance of the inter-racial collaboration, he states that the Melayu
Baru (New Malay) plays a significant role, amongst others: the Melayu Baru denotes the
Malays who had prepared themselves during the NEP times and were ready to undergo ‘a
mental revolution and cultural transformation’ (Mahathir 1991). In short, NEP
successfully reproduces the Melayu Baru social stratum; thus, the economic disparities
between the Malays and the non-Malays were, more or less, eradicate. By closing the
economic gap, the Malays invites the non-Malays into the historic bargain of bangsa to
look for the way forward as Malaysians.
Mahathir believes that the authoritarian rule can guarantee a stable government
to further the economic advancement for a nation; in addition, he indicates that the liberal
values retard the progress of the Western countries – he sees excessive freedom can be
harmful to a community. Mahathir’s authoritative means functions at its height in these
four moves: (a) the 1987 UMNO split; (b) the 1987 Operation Lalang; (c) the 1988
judiciary intervention; (d) the 1998 Anwar’s maltreatment. In 1987, Razaleigh and Musa
challenge the UMNO presidentship of Mahathir and Ghafar; eventually, Mahathir wins
the party election by a narrow margin, he then deregisters the UMNO and re-registers as
UMNO Baru (New UMNO). By resembles the UMNO, Mahathir rejects the RazaleighMusa faction from joining the party; meanwhile, he detains some of these members as
well as other oppositions by using the Internal Security Act. To ensure the judgement is
favored to him, Mahathir demands several constitutional amendments to restrict the
judicial autonomy. By claiming for his doings are to prevent the racial riot, hundreds of
people are arrested in this operation, later also known as Operation Lalang. After that, for
almost a decade, Mahathir’s premiership renders unchallengeable; at the same time, his
deputy Anwar Ibrahim is rising as an anointed successor. Initially, Mahathir and Anwar
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work well together; however, during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997/98, the
disagreement of the financial and monetary policies between them is intensified. At this
very moment, letters, articles, and rumors impeaching Anwar for committing sodomy are
publicized, Mahathir then decides to persecute Anwar from his deputy premiership and
leadership for both the parliament and the party. By 8 September 1998, seven-day after
being sacked, Anwar calls for reformasi – ‘for social and political reforms that opposed
Mahathir’s cronyistic responses to the financial crisis’ (Khoo 2003, p. 100). Later, leading
by Anwar’s wife – Wan Azizah, the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) was founded: PKR’s
objective is to ensure a democratic, progressive, and united multiethnic nation.
Significantly, the reformasi and the formation of PKR bring the possibilities of forming a
multiethnic alliance. At this stage, bangsa Malaysia is no longer an ideological apparatus
solely designed by the state but also rigorously contested by several groups of people that
denied the state power.
PKR forms a new coalition named Barisan Alternatif (BA) by allying with other
opposition parties – the Muslim-based Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), the Chinese-based
Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the multiracial leftist Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM)
to combat the UMNO-led BN in the 1999 General Election. Still, BA loses the Election;
after that, PAS withdraws from the BA due to its contradictory ideology on Islamic State
with the coalition; but, later in 2008, PAS reunites with PKR and DAP to form another
coalition named Pakatan Rakyat (PR) to combat BN in the 2008 and 2013 General
Election. Though the opposition coalition does not topple the ruling coalition, the BN
does experience a critical setback, particularly since the late 2000s. Apart from the rise of
the opposition coalition, the social movement and activism change the face of the political
landscape in millennial Malaysia, i.e., BERSIH, HINDRAF, and PERKASA. The nature
of social activism in Malaysia, according to Govindasamy, is closely associated with the
welfare of racial and religious groups (Govindasamy 2015, p. 116). After the reformasi
movement, there are still activism that concerns the ethnic issue: for instance, the
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HINDRAF demands the preservation of Indian temples and the interest of the Indian
working class; while the PERKASA claims for more room for the Malay rights. However,
there is another trend of social movements which roots in a universal demand for
democratic reform that can mobilize the Malaysian as a whole: for example, BERSIH
earns many supports from promoting the electoral reforms – five rallies are taken place
from 2007 to 2016. The BERSIH movements prepare the Malaysian for a critical
transformation in 2018, along with the rise of Pakatan Harapan (PH). By the 2000s, with
the decline of the ruling coalition and the emergence of the non-racial based activism,
bangsa Malaysia becomes a realm that is more open for contestation – a scene that out of
Mahathir’s script.
Released from imprisonment in 2004, Anwar establishes the coalition of Pakatan
Rakyat (PR), which inherited the ambition of Barisan Altenatif (BA) by restating their
political ideology as social liberalism, social democracy, and social justice. PR contests
Abdullah’s administration in 2008 and Najib’s administration in 2013, despite the loss, it
obtains promising outcomes: by 2008 it wins 82 over 222 parliamentary seats with 47.79%
popular vote; by 2013 it wins 89 over 222 parliamentary seats with 50.87% popular vote.
Later, Anwar faces second sodomy charge in 2015; meanwhile, having retired for
thirteen-year, Mahathir returns to the stage by establishing the Parti Pribumi Bersatu
Malaysia (BERSATU). Functioned as an alternative to UMNO, BERSATU not only
advocates Malay nationalism and Islamic democracy at heart but also emphasizes on anticorruption. Given that the deterioration of Najib’s regime – for his excessive act of
corruption, cronyism, and other crimes, the opposition parties gain unprecedented popular
support ranged from different races and classes. By then, Mahathir resurrects Anwar from
prison; together, they form a new coalition – Pakatan Harapan (PH). PH consists of four
component parties: the Malay-based BERSATU, the multiracial PKR, the Chinese-based
DAP, and the reformist Muslim-based AMANAH. Eventually, PH topples the UMNOled BN in the 2018 General Election by obtains a simple majority at 121 over 222
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parliamentary seats with 48.31% popular vote – it successfully terminates the BN’s sixtyone-year rule in Malaysia. However, from then on, the PH government is continuously
challenged by the BN-led opposition over racial and religious issues. Mahathir, by
February 2020, unnoticedly resigns from his Prime Minister’s post, withdraws BERSATU
from PH, and resolves the parliament immediately; for one week, the state government
remains vacant. Muhyiddin Yassin, the chairman of BERSATU, later claims to obtain
simple majority support from members of parliament. Upon the conferment of Yang dipertuan Agong, the eighth Prime Minister Muhyiddin leads BERSATU, UMNO-BN, and
PAS to form a new ruling coalition – Perikatan National (PN) – to govern the nation from
1 March 2020. This political outbreak signifies that bangsa Malaysia experiences a
setback – the unsettled and repressed question of race, again, reemerges onto the surface.
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PART III
RECONCEPTUALIZING MALAYSIAN CHINESE
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CHAPTER 7
UNDERSTANDING MALAYSIAN CHINESE

The Malay sociopolitical cultural belief of bangsa creates critical impacts not only for
identification but on the historiography of Malaysian Chinese. The focus of Malaysian
Chinese history varies in accordance with their imagination of the locale and homeland
from time to time; therefore, by observing the changing conception of bangsa with
reference to China’s imagination, we can witness the shift of language and narrative in
their history. These alterations in the historical discourse are no changes for its own sake
but indicators of the underlying affection of the narrative. Accordingly, with the spectacle
of bangsa, we can compartmentalize the Malaysian Chinese history into three periods: (a)
imagining China; (b) appropriating China; and (c) unimagining China.

THE FIRST PHASE: IMAGINING CHINA (– 1948)
The stage of Imagining China ranges from 1860 to 1946 when Chinese regards China as
their homeland.
From the twelfth century on, under the Song dynasty’s rule, the Chinese voyagers
start sailing to Southeast Asia for exploration and trading. Reciprocally, the Malay rulers
offer them some local spices occasionally to show their tribute to China, because they
want to maintain good diplomacy with China as it is a powerful state for them. Notably,
in those times, fleets are mainly navigated by the monsoon; thus, the voyagers have to
settle in the Malay states to wait until the next monsoon to bring them back. Then, some
Chinese decide to marry the locals and settle down permanently – they are the first
generation of peranakan. The peranakans conform to the Malay customs, learn the Malay
language, and practice the Malay culture; moreover, they bring the Chinese culture into
the Malay world to create a creolized cultural practice, i.e., the Baba-Nyonya tradition
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which originates in Melaka. (Tan 1999) Later, during the Ming dynasty, Zheng He, the
well-known Chinese diplomat, and mariner, further popularizes the culture and products
of the Malay archipelago to his Chinese compatriots and the world; but, the mass Chinese
migration wave begins in the late nineteenth century after the withdrawal of the sea ban
followed by the signing of 1860 Sino-British Convention. Since then, the Malays start to
perceive the Chinese as the collaborator of British colonists.
Unlike the Baba-Nyonya, the Chinese settlers in the late nineteenth century have
a strong attachment to their homeland China, because their purpose is to earn as much
money as possible and send back to their hometown; thus, the Malays always regard the
Chinese settlers as an economic-driven species. Although others might have a similar
impression on the Chinese race, the Chinese themselves have yet to develop a strong sense
of ethnicity in the early Malaya; instead, they draw their identification towards a dialect
group (Canton, Hokkien, Hakka, Teochew, Hailam, etc.) or a filial tie. Later, apart from
these dialect-filial bonds, a communal-based idea of overseas Chinese, or Huaqiao,
nourishes among the Chinese community: Huaqiao means Chinese living abroad. Its
emergence shall attribute to: (a) the Nanyang-Zhongyuan dichotomy; (b) the collapse of
the Qing dynasty; and (c) the British invention of ethnic Chinse.
Firstly, the traditional Chinese political ideology believes that China is located at
the center of the universe – the zhongyuan (central land); while Southeast Asia, which
situates in the south of China, is the nanyang (southern sea). This zhongyuan-nanyang
dichotomy informs the overseas Chinese about their relation to homeland China from
geographical term to psychological term. Secondly, followed by the collapse of the Qing
dynasty in 1911, Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang popularize the Three People’s
Principles – minzu (nationalism), minquan (democracy), minsheng (livelihood); among
them, minzu has the most impact in the nanyang Chinese communities. Particularly, the
Chinese entrepreneurs send a vast sum of money to support Kuomintang and the resistance
of the Japanese force. Thirdly, the British officially registers the different Chinese dialects
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and filial groups into a unity of ethnic Chinese for the convenience of imposing a divideand-rule system. Through this tripartite discourse of Nanyang, minzu, and ethnic Chinese,
the face of the first phase of Malaya Chinese is revealed – the imaginary homeland China
is their object of desire.

THE SECOND PHASE: APPROPRIATING CHINA (1948 – 1998)
The stage of Appropriating China ranges from 1946 to 1998 when Chinese regards China
as cultural capital to be appropriated to counter the overwhelming Malay dominance.
Dominated in the business sector and mining industry, the Malaya Chinese have
a sole aspiration for money; however, they are politically divided. During the 1930s, four
major divisions are penetrated the Chinese society: (a) the pro-KMT nationalist camp; (b)
the pro-CCP communist camp; (c) the pro-local camp; and (d) the pragmatic camp. By
sharing the same sentiment for anti-Japanese invasion, the nationalists have the most
attachment to Republican China; the communists found the Malayan Communist Party
(MCP) while maintaining a comradeship with Chinese Communist Party (CCP); the
localists concern about their livelihood in Malaya more than their compatriots in China;
the pragmatics donate to the Chinese warfare but carefully manage their relationships with
British governors and local Chinese. In the immediate postwar period, the Sino-Malay
clashes broke in Johor, Negeri Sembilan, Perak, and Selangor. The Malays fear that the
Chinese would take over the state sovereignty, while the communists denounce the
Malay’s collaboration with Japanese during the War, the racial tension is unprecedentedly
heightened. (Khong 1984, p. 32) The return of the British calms the racial antagonism,
but their attitude is more favorable to the Malay and tends to discount the communist
contribution for the War. Later, the British declares the state of emergency to combat the
communist thoroughly. The ruthlessness of the British towards communists weakens its
influence in Malaya; also, the hardships of the War strengthen the local consciousness of
the Malaya Chinese. Lastly, along with the implementation of the Federation of Malaya
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in 1948, a preliminary consensus between the Malays and the non-Malays is construed –
the non-Malays to confer with citizenships in exchange for their political rights.
The foundational principle for the Federation is based on mutual respect for the
bangsa Melayu. Notably, the bangsa Melayu is an antithesis to the Malay monarchy and
the Malayan: it aims at reclaiming the sovereignty to the Malay people by rejecting the
confluence between rulers and governors, as well as the pure imperialist invention of
Malayan. Hence, since the late 1940s, in order to obtain legitimacy and mobilize popular
support, the political coalitions should always safeguard the rights of bangsa Melayu,
regardless of its advocacies and ideologies. For instance, there is a rivalry between the
UMNO-MCA-MIC coalition and the PUTERA-AMCJA6 coalition over the issue of
drafting Federal Constitution in 1947: the UMNO-MCA-MIC represents the views of the
Malay right in alliance with Chinese and Indian representatives, while the PUTERAAMCJA represents the views of Malay left in alliance with Chinese and Indian
representatives – it implies that the Malay opinion has to be putting forward no matter
what its content is. Later, this belief further consolidates when the UMNO-led Alliance
claims victory in the 1955 General Election and leads the Malaya to Independence in 1957.
Even more, the Malay dominated regime ruthlessly denies the challenge from the PAP’s
advocacy of Malaysian Malaysia by expelling Singapore in 1965 and promotes the proMalay policies immediately after the 1969 racial riots, further proves that the Malay
monopoly is true. Thus, the Chinese opt for collaboration instead of confrontation,
negotiation instead of rebellion, and this confrontation and negotiation between Malay
dominance and Chinese subordinates are manifested in the domain of politics, economics,
education, and culture.
Politically, although the Chinese-based parties would bring the Chinese demands
to the cabinet and voice out for the Chinese interest and education occasionally, they
carefully act particularly upon the racial conflicts to avoid the accusation of Chinese
chauvinism or nationalism – unlike the Malay parties and organizations which usually
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earn support when they claim to be a Malay nationalist or radical. Therefore, to maximize
the support, the Chinese-based DAP welcomes the Malay and Indian faces by showing its
multiracial value which aims at achieving social democracy. Economically, people tend
to believe that Chinese would discontent with the implementation of NEP in 1970, on the
contrary, they begin to accept the pro-Malay economic packages soon, because it
stimulates the massive Malay market and encourages the Malay business to collaborate
with the Chinese enterprise, which benefits the Chinese entrepreneurs as well; thus, the
conflicts between Malays and Chinese are not usually money-related. Educationally, the
Chinese act aggressively toward preserving the Chinese schools, because apart from the
prevalent belief of with good education comes wealth among the parents, the Chinese
schools are institutions passing on the Chinese tradition, language, values, literature, and
culture, i.e., the Chineseness (Baharuddin 2004, p. 127). This preservation has its political
implication: preserving the Chinese tradition makes a discursive space available for the
Chinese to confront the Malay dominance. Therefore, culturally, the Chinese tend to draw
China’s origin to a local Malaysian Chinese practice. For instance, lou-saang, a dish
consisted of several colorful vegetables, crispy chips, and vermicelli, is originated from
Malaysia, but people always associate it with some Canton cuisine. During this period,
China is no longer served as an object of desire; rather, it is the bangsa Melayu becomes
an object of desire for Malaysian Chinese, while imaginary China allows a space for them
to maneuver between their Chineseness and Malaysianness.

THE THIRD PHASE: UNIMAGINING CHINA (1998 –)
The stage of Unimagining China begins from 1998 when Chinese articulate their
Chineseness not from China but from the locality.
Facilitated the interethnic relation by using authoritarian means, Razak and
Mahathir have different philosophies and approaches. Razak’s mission is solely focused
on devising a new national-building economic package to close the gap between the
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Malays and the non-Malays, while Mahathir’s vision is to eternally eliminate the Malay
backwardness by treating the Malay dilemmas (Mahathir 1970; 1986): Razak is a
pragmatist, Mahathir is an idealist. Thus, under the Razak’s leadership, the MalayChinese conflict is significantly mitigated since the implementation of NEP and the
formation of BN coalition, but under the Mahathir’s leadership, the ethnic-tension
becomes a means for him to achieve the peak of power. Publicized since 1970, Mahathir
indicates that the Malay dilemma, apart from their incapability to follow the modern
capitalist world, is attributed to the Chinese economic dominance and the Western
monopoly of money market, hence, by targeted at the Chinese, Mahathir wins the Malay
popular support. Similarly, by challenges the monarchy’s constitutional power,
suppresses the PAS and DAP opposition, and purges the rebellious UMNO’s faction,
Mahathir successfully mobilizes the conservative and rural votes to secure his premiership.
By proposes the Vision 2020 in 1991, the idea of bangsa Malaysia strengthens the
national consciousness, particularly for the non-Malays. However, the Mahathir’s bangsa
Malaysia is more like an act to incorporate the non-Malay discourse into a superficial
bangsa to eliminate the dichotomy between bangsa Melayu and bangsa-bangsa asing.
The first predicament for Malaysian Chinese, it occurs, is the eternal absence of
Chineseness in this Malaysianness – the alternative discourse associated with their racial
identity is under threat.
Initiated from a massive discontent for the Anwar’s maltreatment to broader
social activism demanding for democratization, the 1998 reformasi movement redefines
the substance of bangsa Malaysia originally intended by Mahathir – the Mahathir’s idea
is to repackage bangsa Melayu as bangsa Malaysia, i.e., make Malayness appear as
Malaysianness; yet, the reformasi projects the bangsa Malaysia as a sphere to voice out
the Malaysian disaffection to the authoritarian regime. Gradually, the power of defining
bangsa Malaysia shifts from the state to the people; moreover, it creates an ideological
edifice to channel the affection within the bangsa Melayu to the larger sphere of bangsa
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Malaysia: considered that the reformasi movement starts as a Malay opposition at the
Anwar’s maltreatment, then becomes a site to accommodate dissenting voices and social
criticism, and finally transforms to large-scale civil activism directed at the state
hegemony (Khoo 2003, pp. 100 – 108). For Malaysian Chinese, the previous state-defined
bangsa Malaysia, which tries to eliminate Chineseness secretly, therefore, becomes a
civil-defined bangsa Malaysia, which invites interracial collaboration to crush the
authority. Yet, it brings the predicament to a second level: for decades, Chineseness is
served to counter the Malay hegemony, not the state establishment, and now it has to
change its faces.
Launched by Anwar in September 1998, the reformasi rallies and sentiment do
not cease after the imprisonment of Anwar; on the contrary, the supporters react more
aggressively than before – the movement goes ‘beyond Anwar’ (Gomez 2007, p. 1). Later,
the formation of BA further escalates the reformasi into a constitutional level: the BA
acquires much support from the youth and the subordinated groups; more importantly, it
crushes the BN’s stronghold in the Malay rural areas. Thus, Mahathir decides to pass his
premiership to Abdullah; furthermore, universal awareness of Muslim terrorism invoked
after the 911 incident directly wrecks the image of conservative Muslim-based PAS,
which advocates establishing Islamic State. Eventually, the BN secures its helm in the
2004 General Election and calls an end to the reformasi movement. Yet, the spirit of
reformasi later reemerges in the BERSIH movement; more significantly, this sentiment
starts developing by a cross-ethnic endeavor for democratization. The critical conceptual
realm of bangsa Malaysia, at this stage, becomes a site of vigorous contestation between
the state hegemony and the ‘popular culture’ (in Gramsci’s term; Turner 2003, p. 168).
Hence, there are two kinds of bangsa: the state’s bangsa, which aims at eliminating the
non-Malayness; and the people’s bangsa, which aims at democratizing the authoritarian
regime. Correspondingly, there are two kinds of Chineseness: the Chineseness, which
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appropriates Chinese tradition to counter the Malay-dominated state hegemony; and the
Chineseness, which unimagines its China’s root to register into Malaysianness fully.
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CHAPTER 8
GAPS BETWEEN MALAYS AND CHINESE IN BANGSA MALAYSIA

Malays are not the earliest inhabitants in Southeast Asia; instead, tracing back between
4000 and 3000 BCE, their ancestors are some sort of Austronesian speakers who resides
in current Taiwan archipelago; they start migrating southward to current Philippines and
Borneo since 2500 BCE; they then move further to Borneo hinterland, Java, Sumatra, the
Malay peninsula and the Vietnam since 1500 BCE (Andaya 2004, p. 57). Derived from
the Austronesian, these migrants in current Maphilindo area are now commonly known
as Proto-Malayo-Polynesian (Bellwood 1997, p. 242); they speak Malayic language, so
we can still see tones of resemblances among Melayu, Indonesian, and Tagalog now. The
earliest sense of bangsa is, therefore, taken shape through a language tie.
Yet, the exact word Melayu appears for the first time in a note by the Chinese
Buddhist pilgrim Yijing in 644. According to Yijing’s notes, his purpose of visiting
Melayu is to learn Sanskrit in order to read Buddhist scripture; he then returns to Melayu
again from 689 to 695 and finds that Melayu has become a part of Srivijaya (Andaya 2004,
p. 60). After the fall of Srivijaya, Melayu comes under the siege of Majapahit, then Melaka
and other Malay sultanates. That means the sense of bangsa among Melayu transforms
from a linguistic tie to a kerajaan tie. This bangsa Melayu with kerajaan tie endures
during the Portuguese and Dutch administration because the early form of colonization
focuses on exploiting natural resources instead of intervening the local politics.
Nationalism in Europe begins to hit Southeast Asia in the late nineteenth century
and wakes some Malay intellectuals to stand up for bangsa Melayu though their influences
in Malay community are lukewarm. Yet, as Benedict Anderson suggests, the arrival of
print-capitalism in Southeast Asia accelerates the national consciousness of the people
(Anderson 1991, pp. 37 – 46). Ariffin Omar observes that, the print media in the early
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twentieth century helped to spread some key ideas for people in Malaya to make sense of
the status quo in the peninsular Malaya.

With the advent of print, Malay newspapers and journals in the first half of the
twentieth century, though limited in circulation, were able to forge a commonality
in the understanding and use of terms like bangsa Melayu, DKK (darah keturunan
Keling or Indian blood descent) and DKA (darah keturunan Arab or Arab blood
descent). They propagated effectively against the emergence of the imagined
‘Malayan’ community and showed forth its political and historical weaknesses.
(Omar 2015, p. 22)
In the 1930s, some Malays are moved by the nationalist promotion of kedaulatan rakyat
(the people’s regime). The Malay people start directing their rages towards the Malay
aristocrats and the non-Malays. Firstly, the Malay sultans are not ready to become a total
independent polity; instead, they want the peninsular Malaya to remain a protectorate.
Secondly, the British recruits too many foreigners to lodge in the Malay lands. Under such
circumstances, the sense of bangsa transforms from a kerajaan tie to a Malay nationalist
tie, and this Malay nationalist tie continues to strengthen after the War ended. Then, after
the formation of Federation of Malaya in 1948, this Malay nationalist tie allows the
existence of non-Malays but stresses that they are not a part of the bangsa Melayu.
After getting along for decades since Independence, the Malays appear more
comfortably with the non-Malay inhabitants. However, it is not solely because they start
knowing each other more or removing their wall to embrace differences; instead, it is
because the material structure of Malaysia has changed. By implementing the NEP after
the 1969 riot, the economic breach between Malays and non-Malays are gradually
diminished. Meanwhile, Mahathir sees that bangsa Melayu is no longer a useful concept
for national and economic progress; therefore, he reinvents bangsa Melayu into bangsa
Malaysia. This is an ideological move. Ostensibly, the non-Malays is officially given
tickets into the realm of bangsa; however, through incorporation with the non-Malays into
the bangsa, the Malays can utilize the non-Malay capitals with a stronger nationalistic and
moral appeals. In other words, bangsa Malaysia remains a core of bangsa Melayu. Here,
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bangsa transforms from a Malay nationalist tie to a Malaysian nationalist tie and brings
in an ideological contestation between the Malays and the non-Malays simultaneously.
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of Chinese settlers in peninsular Malaya:
(a) the peranakan Chinese; and (b) the huaqiao Chinese. Firstly, the peranakan Chinese
arrive in the Malay peninsula since the twelfth-century; they are mainly voyagers,
merchants, and some retinues of China diplomats; they marry the local Malay woman and
have their life and family here. Secondly, the huaqiao Chinese arrive in the peninsular
Malay during the British administration; they are coolies, businessmen, and expats; they
move southward mainly for earning money but some because of prosecution. However,
no matter which group these Chinese belong, they see the idea of bangsa and bangsa
Melayu as a potential threat, because they are all bangsa-bangsa asing in the eyes of
Malays. Under such a circumstance, the Chinese identify with the idea of nanyang, which
implies that their homeland is China; and by internalizing the nanyang consciousness,
they not only immediately withdraw from competing to be a part of bangsa but also
demonstrate their capability through China’s great power.
The rise of local consciousness of Malaysian Chinese in 1960s does not make the
nanyang consciousness retreat from the Chinese communities. Until now, we can simply
witness many Chinese schools, institutions, enterprises, and organizations which name
after the word nanyang; even more so, some Malaysian-Singaporean Chinese culture are
prefixed with the word nanyang to differentiate with China’s Chinese culture, such as
Nanyang coffee and Nanyang arts. However, leaving aside the word, the uses of nanyang
are different. Malaysian Chinese with strong local consciousness do not regard nanyang
as a sign of being in the south of China but instead a self-sufficient region. Interestingly,
nanyang denotes the land of Malaysia-Singapore in a geographical term but connotes the
Malaysian-Singaporean Chinese in an ideological term. In other words, while bangsa
becomes a space that dominated by the Malays, nanyang reclaims a space that dominated
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by Chinese. This second phase of nanyang consciousness among Malaysian Chinese
embodies in their preservation of Chinese culture and education.
The emergence of bangsa Malaysia in the 1990s inevitably disrupts the discursive
balance of bangsa and nanyang. Malaysian Chinese are now absorbed into the realm of
bangsa (bangsa Malaysia) but not at the very core of the bangsa (bangsa Melayu). For
instance, Minister of Education changed the title of Bahasa Melayu (Malay language) to
Bahasa Malaysia (Malaysian language) in 2007; moreover, Mahathir proposes to establish
a new stream of Sekolah Wawasan (vision school) that combines both characteristics of
Sekolah Kebangsaan (national school) and Sekolah Jenis Kebangsaan (vernacular school).
These projects are perfect embodiments of the idea of bangsa Malaysia: the state invents
an empty cube to rehabilitate then further enhance an orthodoxy. However, the reformasi
movement in the late 1990s and the bersih movement in the 2000s attempt to redefine the
idea of bangsa Malaysia through mobilizing the massive social discontents towards the
authoritarian state. Significantly, the rise of Chinese proportion from reformasi to bersih
signifies that Malaysian Chinese seek to step out from an old bangsa-nanyang
configuration and try to accommodate themselves into a new composition of bangsa
Malaysia.
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CHAPTER 9
MOMENTS OF ABSENCE IN THE HISTORY OF MALAYSIAN CHINESE

This chapter attempts to see the history of Malaysian Chinese through the lens of bangsa
Malaysia which means examining Chinese in Malaysian history as a whole instead of a
particular race-based perspective. Through which a clear vision might not be obtained as
the official Malaysian history assumes a Malay political elitist narrator, but weaving the
moments of absence in the narrative of Malaysian Chinese can provide us a chance to
look into what predicaments are they facing in retelling their history and rebuilding their
Malaysian identity, i.e., the identity of bangsa Malaysia.

MOMENT OF ABSENCE I: NOT AT HOME, 1948
Home is not there for Malayan Chinese after the War ended because the postwar Malaya
experiences a critical resurgence of Malay nationalism. The Japanese surrender does not
put Malaya immediately in a peaceful state; instead, the Malays rival against the Malayan
Communist Party on the issue of land distribution over almost a month. Thus, the British
return to Malaya in 1946 is widely welcomed by the Malays because the British governor
determines that the prewar law and order will restore to the Malaya. Immediately, the
Union scheme is drafted and consented by all Malay sultans; then, the Malays protest to
the Union scheme and condemn the betrayal of sultans. Overwhelmed by an immense
pressure from the Malay people, the British revises the Union scheme and replaces it with
the Federation scheme. The Federation scheme satisfies the Malay people, but the Malay
society begins to polarize into two camps: the conservative Malay nationalists, and the
liberal Malay nationalists. Lastly, the conservative Malay nationalists claim victory in the
1955 General Election; more importantly, their ideology dominates the sociopolitical
culture of Malaya/Malaysia ever since. Malayan Chinese, on the other hand, do not have
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any weight in these sociopolitical bargains; they are neither here at Malaya nor there at
China. In the following paragraphs, I examine several forms of existence of Malayan
Chinese and their predicaments: (a) the Malayan Chinese conservatives; (b) the Malayan
Chinese liberals; (c) the Malayan Chinese communists; and (d) the Malayanness.
The Malayan Chinese conservatives collaborate with the Malay establishment to
promote a multiracial nation with Malay nationalism at its core; besides, they assist the
British commissioners to combat the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in the postwar
era. Leading by the Straits Chinese leader Tan Cheng Lock, they found the Malaysian
Chinese Association (MCA) in 1949; MCA’s membership consists of mostly government
officials, businessmen, educationalists, philanthropists, and local gentries. Hence, with
the most powerful men among the Chinese community, MCA is deemed as a spokesman
of Malayan Chinese; however, as a non-Malay party within the UMNO-led Alliance, it
makes very limit influences in the parliament, and people also realize that these Chinese
elites safeguard only for their business interest. After the General Election in 1959, the
non-Malay opposition parties arise to compete with MCA for Chinese support; they are
the Labor Parties (PPP), and the People’s Action Party (PAP, later replaces by DAP). It
turns out that the PPP and the PAP defeat MCA in some Chinese majority towns (Means
1970, pp. 225 - 264); since then, the Chinese community is split into a solid two: the
conservatives and the liberals. It occurs, the predicament of the pro-MCA conservatives
is that they could neither find a home within the Malay establishment nor a home within
the Chinese communities.
The Malayan Chinese liberals join hands with the Malay liberals to strive for a
multiracial and democratic Malaya that based on mutual respect for all Malayan citizens
regardless of ethnicity and class. In May 1947, the British commissioner Sir Edward Gent
decides to put a stop to the Union scheme after severe social unrests break out among the
Malay communities; then, Gent invites the UMNO leaders and the Malay rulers to form
a working committee to draft the Federation constitution; the constitution remains the
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significant prospects of the Union scheme except for upholding the Malay special position
(Omar 2015, p. 129). On the other hand, the Malay liberal organization the Pusat Tenaga
Rakyat (PUTERA, Centre of People’s Power) collaborates with the Chinese liberal
organization the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action (PMCJA) to establish a coalition
to voice their disaffection towards the Federation scheme. By rejecting the Federation
constitution, the PUTERA-PMCJA coalition submit the People’s constitution that insists
on establishing a democratic state council and conferring equal political rights for all
citizens who regards Malaya as their permanent home. (p. 147) Although their proposal
is not accepted by either officials or Malay majority, it is the first collaboration between
the Malay and the non-Malay liberals. Meanwhile, we shall also see that the Chinese can
only articulate their opinion and gain legitimacy through a partnership with Malays, no
matter a conservative voice or a liberal voice. Thus, the pro-liberal Malayan Chinese can
neither find a home for their articulation nor find an articulation that can be a home.
The Malayan Chinese communists have an immense contribution in resisting the
Japanese invasion during the wartime. Founded in 1930, the MCP is one of the CCP’s
oversea branches, and its members are also dominated by the oversea Chinese (huaqiao).
The British and the Malays are extremely cautious about its movement; also, the colonial
government issues warrant to arrest these MCP members. Meanwhile, the MCP donates
a lot of anti-Japanese funds to their homeland China, so the Malays also tend to believe
all the Chinese are only loyal to China if not CCP. In December 1941, when the Japanese
arrives at peninsular Malaya, the MCP immediately organizes an armed resistant force
called Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). The MPAJA disrupts the
Japanese invasion and accelerates the surrender of Japanese in Southeast Asia. Notably,
during the wartime, the Japanese behaves mild to Malays but extremely brutal to Chinese;
this sharpens the antagonistic relation between the Malays and the Chinese in the
immediate postwar time. According to historian Buyong Adil, upon the Japanese leave,
the MPAJA forces murder the Malays who previously support the Japanese (Buyong Adil
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1971, p. 323 – 324). The British returns to Malaya one month after the Japanese surrender
and establish many designated villages to restrict the movements of Chinese; in 1948, the
British announce a state of emergency to begin an extensive hunt for the MCP members.
On the other hand, although the oversea Chinese do contribute many funds back in their
homeland, China’s Chinese tend to see these huaqiao as traitors and collaborators. The
fate of Malayan Chinese communists reveals that they are not at home not only in terms
of their physical existence but also in terms of their discursive existence.
However, a few though questions have yet to be answered: (a) who is the Malayan;
(b) is Malayan a legitimate utterance; (c) what about the bangsa Malayan? The word
‘Malayan’ is indeed problematic. British author Michael Ardizzone writes, “Malay is a
member of the Malay race; Malayan is a person of any other origin who happens to live
in Malaya (Ardizzone 1946, p. 34)”; apparently, this is a British imperialist view; in fact,
the Malays would not accept this definition of Melayu and Malayan. From the view of the
Malay conservatives, both the Malaya and the Malayan are nothing more than a colonial
invention. Therefore, when the British carry out the idea of Malayan Union, it is not only
those policies do harm the Malay nationalism but the idea of ‘Malayan’ itself is untenable;
thus, when it comes to ‘Federation of Malaya’, the Malays carefully translate it as
‘Persekutuan Tanah Melayu’ (Federation of Malay land). For the Malays, the idea of
Malayan commonly denotes to the inhabitants in the Malay land other than Melayu, its
legitimacy is doubtful depends on its use; and the bangsa Malayan would absolutely be
an antithesis to the bangsa Melayu. Under such a circumstance, the Malayan Chinese who
regards Malaya as permanent home ironically find no home in their Malayan identity,
meanwhile they are also not at their China’s home anymore.
The idea of home moves beyond a physical presence to an extent of sociopolitical
and ideological space. In the immediate postwar Malaya, the conservatives find no home
in either the Malay establishment camp or the Chinese popular camp, the liberals find no
home in either their own articulation or other discursive space, and the communists find
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no home in either the physical or ideological territory; on the other hand, Malayan as an
identity also becomes not legible in the eyes of Malay nationalism. The 1948 is a moment
of absence for Malayan Chinese; they need to settle elsewhere, but not here and there.

MOMENT OF ABSENCE II: NOT A TRUTH, 1969
According to the state official account, the outbreak of the May 13 Incident in 1969 shall
attribute to: (a) the excessive post-election celebration of the opposition supporters; and
(b) the intention of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). In the 1969 General Election,
the ruling Alliance Party experiences a major setback. On the federal level election, it fails
to maintain a two-thirds majority, which allows it to amend the Constitution; on the state
level election, it almost loses the Selangor and Negeri Sembilan to the opposition. As the
official sources write, the Chinese see it as a victory for their communal interest; while
their overreaction provokes the Malay communities; hence, the racial riots between the
Malays and the Chinese break out spontaneously. Meanwhile, the communists devise to
take control of some local towns through manipulating the racial tension. The official
discourse tends to blame on the MCP, while the public opinion widely conceives it as a
consequence of challenging the Malay status quo. Subsequently, the May 13 Incident is
listed as an extremely sensitive issue which is not allowed to discuss in public; thus, for
the millennial Malaysian, it is like a haunted story recurring over and over, but nobody
knows whether it is a truth.
However, some declassified British archival of the May 13 Incident in the 2000s
reveals that the racial riot is not as spontaneous as it occurs. Published in 2007 soon after
the release of British classified archival, Kua Kia Soong’s May 13: Declassified
Documents on the Malaysian Riots of 1969 exposes some important news, journals,
telegrams, and interviews back then (Kua 2007). According to his analysis, one major
reason that leads to the May 13 Incident is the UMNO internal rivalry between the
Tunku’s old aristocratic class and the Razak’s new state capitalist class (ibid, p. 123). The
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public usually recognize the fact that back then the demographic ratio by race is about
half-and-half for the Malay and the non-Malay population, and the Malay majority rural
site is allocated for more seats than the heavy-populated Chinese majority urban site; still,
the opposition makes a major advancement; therefore, the Malays might worry that their
special position is in danger, and it eventually leads to the outbreak of racial riots. Yet,
this is only the facade painted by the official discourse; in fact, there is a faction leading
by the Deputy Prime Minister within the UMNO, which arises in the 1960s through
manipulating the state capitals in favor of the Malay agricultural enterprises in order to
win supports from the rural Malays, wants to crush the Tunku’s leadership. The evidence
shows that this UMNO state capital class might somehow involve in plotting the May 13
Incident.
Tunku and Razak immediately blame the communists on invoking the riots on 13
May; however, no evidence shows that the MCP is behind the clash; in fact, the 1948-60
emergency almost disintegrates them; yet there are witnesses to some Malay mobsters
who assemble at the residence of the Chief Minister of Selangor on that day, and the riot
breaks out soon. Two days later, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong declares a state of emergency,
and also appoints Razak to lead an interim National Operation Council soon to restore
law and order; by then, Razak is in control of the cabinet and Tunku retains his
premiership without power. Moreover, the armed forces and police are reported not only
discriminating against Chinese but also collaborating with the Malay thugs to rob the
Chinese shop and burn their cars; however, it is noteworthy that there are only few Malays
who agree with these violent acts; it is not a pure Malay versus Chinese episode as
represented in the official record. According to the official statistics, there are 137 killed
and 18 of them are Malays, but the real number might be ten times or more. Malaysia
finally restores to normalcy in a few months, yet this new normalcy begins a new era.
The Razak’s new state capitalist class is different from the Tunku’s old
aristocratic class in three ways: (a) the ultra-Malay centrism; (b) the military-inclined
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regime; (c) the authoritarian state. After the Razak’s faction defeats the Tunku’s
leadership, two major reforms are soon taken place. First, the National Cultural Policies
(NCP) assures that the Malay culture and customs shall be the foundation of all Malaysian;
apart from this, the Malay language shall also be the sole official language of Malaysia.
Second, the National Economic Policies (NEP) aims to close the economic breach
between the Malays and the Chinese. In the meantime, Razak also asks the British and
Australia to provide him some extra armed forces and military equipment. The British
have agreed to Razak’s request because it believes this is a critical period for Malaysian
to pay particular attention to preempt the communist from resurrection; while the
Australian has rejected Razak because it is immoral given that the state is reported abusing
the security forces to mistreat the Malaysian with Chinese descent. Furthermore, Razak
amends the Constitution to restrict people from discussing the sensitive race issues in
public, and the amendments include strengthening the state censorship on media,
education, and academia. These three directions put the democratic progress in Malaysia
in stagnancy if not backward.
In addition, the other notable transformation under the Razak’s administration is
a conceptual alteration from an Alliance formula to a Barisan formula. Upon the British
return to Malaya, some prominent Chinese leaders are summoned to form a communal
organization. On the one hand, the British need a communal organization to represent the
Malayan Chinese in the Independence project; but more importantly, it functions as an
ideological alternative for the Malayan Chinese other than MCP. Hence, the Malayan
Chinese Association (MCA) is formed in 1949 and incorporates with the Malayan Indian
Congress (MIC) and UMNO to constitute a multiracial Alliance Party in 1954.
Represented by all three major races in Malaya/Malaysia, the Alliance formula ensures
opinions from different racial sectors will be heard. Yet during the 1960s, the Chinese and
Indian think the MCA and the MIC are mere puppets endorsing with all UMNO’s agenda,
the Malays think that the UMNO does not endeavor in upholding the Malay special
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position. Under such circumstances, the Razak’s faction emerges as a Malay-centric force
within the state power, and successfully mobilizes the Malay rural supports. After
succeeding Tunku as Prime Minister, Razak incorporates all major opposition parties
except the Democratic Action Party (DAP) to form the Barisan National (BN). Unlike the
Alliance formula, the Barisan formula is clearly dominated by the UMNO by putting all
the other component parties in the eclipse of UMNO. Likewise, the non-Malay
communities also gradually lose their bargaining power under the overwhelming Malay
hegemony.
Half-a-century has passed; however, the May 13 Incident seems never to depart.
In the 1987 Operation Lalang, Mahathir threatens his dissidents to deliberate thoroughly
about the consequences of challenging the state by referring to May 13 Incident; likewise,
the state brings out this tragedy over and over before every General Election. Ironically,
this is the state issuing the Ordinance to restrict people from talking about it, but this is
also the state that keeps reminding people about this episode. Perhaps the politicians have
no clues as well about what and how the May 13 Incident happens back then; they simply
employ it as a tale to intimidate people to watch out and prevent them from doing
something. In other words, the May 13 Incident can be deemed as a pure ideology; or
better, it is always a pure ideology since it breaks out. In Kua’s final remarks, it writes to
completely outlaw the fascist tendencies in the Malaysian race-based politics, they must
first to ‘exorcise the ghosts of May 13’ (ibid, p. 134). The Malaysian Chinese are suffering
from the absence of truth since 1969, as the truth is neither some coldhearted numbers or
data, nor some excavated on-the-spot real experiences, but the constant not-being-there
when the ‘truth’ is articulated.

MOMENT OF ABSENCE III: NOT WITH PAST, 1991
Some colonies or colonized subjects do not have their own history; or, they have lost the
stories of their own. Regions having no past normally attribute to three reasons. First of
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all, there is no civilization in that area; secondly, there is no precolonial history in that
area; thirdly, there is not a self-sufficient entity. Yet the polity needs a narrative to justify
its presence; therefore, it starts manufacturing ideologies to its subject, in order to make
the absence appears as presence. From this perspective, the Malayan/Malaysian history
has its own absence; the absence, it occurs, is the over-repression of the problematic
Malayanness/Malaysianness: the Independence merely represents the Malayanness at its
form without substance, and the May 13 Incident further rejects the discussion for the
Malaysianness. However, intrigued by the 1991’s proposal of bangsa Malaysia, the
Malaysians again return to their repression.
There is no pre-Independent history for Malayan/Malaysian since Malaya does
not exist until it becomes a British colony. In the late eighteenth century, the British naval
forces made their first disembarkation in Penang Island, and took control of it after
reaching a consensus with the local Malay sultan; later, the British continue to conquer
the other Malay sultanates; in the meantime, the Dutch influence penetrates into the
peninsula; by 1824, both of them agree to draw the line at the strait of Melacca where the
British take control of the peninsular Malay states and the Dutch take control of the
Sumatran Malay sultanates. After demarcated the borderline, the British commonly call
all these Malay state colonies as Malaya; until the early twentieth century, they officially
merge all the Strait Settlements, the Federated Malay States, and the Unfederated Malay
States together as a united polity; by then, the idea of Malaya is realized and started to
popularize in public. Yet the dilution of border consciousness does not spark a Malayan
identity; instead, it unites the Malays across the border, and result in a Melayu identity.
The British, however, demand a multiracial leadership as a condition for Independence,
so the Malay invites the Chinese and the Indian to form an alliance government solely for
this purpose. Malaya/Malaysia is built upon a promise of a multiracial community on its
surface; however, the unfinished formation of Malayan/Malaysian identity is repressed in
the deep down of Malaysian history.
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The Malaysian identity becomes a more suppressed issue after the outbreak of the
May 13 Incident, yet it is Mahathir who brings this problematic Malaysianness back onto
the discussion. Mahathir is expelled from his UMNO’s membership by Tunku when
Malaysia returns to normalcy after the outbreak because of his call for the Tunku’s
resignation (Wain 2010, p. 26); nonetheless, he becomes one of the most reputable Malay
spokesmen after publishing The Malay Dilemma in 1970. At the Razak’s invitation,
Mahathir comes back as Minister of Education; and, before Hussein’s succession of
Razak’s premiership in 1976, he is deemed as a potential candidate for the future Prime
Minister. Mahathir rises as a new state capitalist class in line with the Razak’s faction;
however, his hardcore Malay-centric ideology is more ambitious than Razak. The Razak’s
NEP initially aims to restructure the society through eradicating the Malay poverty, while
the Mahathir’s NEP/NDP attempts to rehabilitate the Malays into an authoritariancapitalist Malaysian state. First of all, he centralizes the constitutional power in the hand
of Parliament, and eliminates the old aristocratic class members from the UMNO.
Secondly, he introduces the capitalist ethics into the traditional Islam teachings, and
creates an alternative to the classic PAS’s Islam. Thirdly, he stabilizes the bangsa Melayu
through relocating it into a larger configuration of bangsa Malaysia. Therefore, the
repressed Malaysian identity back on stage in the 1990s.
Under the Mahathir’s administration, the 1980s Malaysia experiences a marked
economic advancement due to the development of the manufacturing industry, the
maturity of the monetary market, and the privatization of state-own projects. Although
there are a financial crisis and several political turmoils in the late 1980s, Mahathir’s
contributions to the modernization of Malaysia are widely recognized. Furthermore, he
centralizes more power in his hands through prosecuting the dissidents from the UMNO,
the Parliament, and the opposition camps. In 1991, Mahathir announces the Vision 2020
and raises a catchy idea – bangsa Malaysia. The Mahathir’s bangsa Malaysia promotes
interracial harmony in its surface but intends to extend the Malay hegemony to the non-
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Malays in its deep heart. In the economic sphere, bangsa Malaysia encourages Malay
enterprises to incorporate with the Chinese business and vice versa. In the ideological
sphere, bangsa Malaysia legitimizes the Malay special position as an internal logic of all
Malaysian. From the 1990s on, the state commercials start promoting interracial
comradeship by depicting the harmonious relationship among three races, the moment of
Merdeka, the hardship of ordinary Malaysia, and et cetera. All these efforts eventually
lead the Barisan National and UMNO a tremendous victory in the 1995 General Election.
Yet the idea of bangsa Malaysia does not remain as an ideological state apparatus for
long; instead, the people’s voices begin to infiltrate it, and later transform it into a space
to question the Malaysianness.
Mahathir deliberately cultivates the idea of bangsa Malaysia to Malaysian since
1991. On the one hand, the bangsa Malaysia as an ideological state apparatus proves
tremendous results; on the other hand, it engenders a common imagination and invites a
shared language among the Malaysian across racial borders. For instance, reports show
that there is a steady growth of Malay children in Chinese schools in the 1990s (Khoo
2003, pp. 27 – 28). Besides, for three years from 1995 to 1997, the Chinese and Muslim
calendars are coincidently within the same month, and the term Gongxi Raya (combining
the Chinese Gongxifacai and the Muslim Hari Raya) is on viral. These examples reflect a
fact: perhaps the initial intention of bangsa Malaysia is quite cynical, but it can be taken
and used in a good way. As Michel de Certeau suggests, popular culture can make do with
what is offered to it (Turner 2003, p. 182). Accordingly, the state bangsa Malaysia
gradually becomes the people’s bangsa Malaysia, and becomes an ideological source of
defiance against the state. The outbreak of 1998 reformasi movement can be read as a
contestation between the state bangsa Malaysia and the people’s bangsa Malaysia. By
then, Mahathir sacks Anwar from the cabinet and the UMNO because of his alleged moral
misconduct; later, Anwar is imprisoned for five years. The mistreatment of Anwar strikes
the chord of social grievances, and the people start coming out to support the Anwar’s
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call for reformasi. The reformasi later escalates into a large-scale social activism that
contains dissenting voices from different sectors. According to Farish Noor, the reason
why the reformasi can make such an impact is because of its over-determined nature and
ambiguity (Noor 1999, p. 13). Precisely, this over-determined nature also allows the
bangsa Malaysia slipping into the reformasi; by joining hand together, the reformasi
becomes a nationalist movement for the first time in Malaysia. Vice versa, it redefines the
bangsa Malaysia as a united Malaysian against the authoritarian state. Freed from the
state intervention, the Malaysian can search for the absence in Malaysianness.
The Malay, Chinese and Indian have their respective history, but the Malaysian
have no past. The Alliance formula represses the Malayanness as a currency to exchange
Independence. The May 13 Incident represses the Malaysianness as a taboo which might
sabotage the national solidarity. The Mahathir’s bangsa Malaysia resurrects the
Malaysianness as an ideological means to assert domination of dissidents. The people’s
bangsa Malaysia appropriates the state sources search for their Malaysianness. Perhaps
there is no authentic Malayan/Malaysian history in the official account, since the state is
too adapted to exploit a certain racial and communal perspective to view and review the
pasts. Paradoxically, the absence of the past might be the only past that can be certain.

MOMENT OF ABSENCE IV: NOT WITH HOPE, 2020
Hope can function as a drive or an illusion. Hope as a drive directs humans to proceed in
a certain orientation. Hope as an illusion feeds humans with false representation and
excessive ecstasy. Likewise, the disintegration of hope leads to an emotion of despair and
total disillusionment. The disenchanted subject, therefore, either escapes from that
ideological edifice or enrolls in another hope. In short, the hopelessness is political.
Mahathir, as noted in before, read his Vision 2020 to all Malaysian on 28 February
1991. The Vision 2020 has a far-reaching impact in the nation-building of Malaysia as it
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is not simply a politician’s manifesto but an ideological bedrock for contemporary
Malaysia. According to John Hilley, the Mahathir’s Vision 2020 ‘contextualizes popular
understandings of modernization, social mobility and cross-ethnic prosperity as part of an
inclusive national framework’, therefore helps the state to establish ‘a strong popular
association between the idea of “collective economic development” and Vision 2020 as a
signifier of future reward’ (Hilley 2001, pp. 6 – 7). Its main prospects are: (a) establish a
Malaysian nation consists of one bangsa Malaysia; (b) prepare to face all kind of
adversities; (c) develop a democratic and ethical society; (d) create a liberal society free
of discrimination; (e) cultivate a scientific and innovative spirit; (f) prioritize the
collective before self; and (g) ensure an economically-just society. Notably, the rhetoric
of Vision 2020 is not solely imposed by the state, but some individuals also begin to use
the word wawasan (vision) as their company’s name. In the meantime, Malaysia in the
early 1990s is experiencing a tremendous economic growth insofar as the World Bank
proclaims it as an East Asian Miracle; so Malaysian during that time ‘saw nothing but
wealth’ (Halim 1999, p. 189). The Mahathir’s office is resumed by Abdullah Badawi in
2003 and later by Najib Razak in 2009; both of them continue to champion the Vision
2020.
However, the Vision 2020 starts to lose its script since 2008. The UMNO-led BN
under Abdullah’s leadership and Najib’s leadership fails to win a two-thirds majority in
both the 2008 and 2013 General Election, respectively. Notably, the ruling coalition will
be allowed to amend the Constitution with a two-thirds majority mandate. Finally, the
people succeed to vote down the UMNO-led BN and terminate its sixty-one-year rule in
Malaysia through the 2018 General Election. Soon, the domestic and international media
all celebrate the victory of Malaysian, and depict it as the people’s victory. It is indeed
delightful in terms of the Malaysian topple the corrupted government through ballot box
despite the severe gerrymandering and malapportionment. Yet it is too naive to believe
that it is a result of enduring combat between the corrupted state and the people. There are

77

three main reasons which lead to the collapse of the UMNO-led BN. First, Najib’s
misdeed involves not only corruption and money laundering but also a handful of strange
murders and disappearances. Second, the calls for the Najib’s resignation not only comes
from the Bersih protestors but also among the UMNO and the Malay leadership (Ooi 2019,
p. 43). Lastly and most importantly, the UMNO and Najib’s fall is neatly devised by
Mahathir. Having retired for thirteen-year long, Mahathir returns to the political stage in
his nineties by setting up BERSATU (Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia). He knows that to
win the Election, the opposition coalition needs to represent all range of social sectors by
providing a variety of ideologies; therefore, he founds the Pakatan Harapan (PH). The
PH’s component parties include the Malay-based BERSATU, the Chinese-based DAP,
the Anwar-led PKR, and the Muslim-based AMANAH. It follows: the BERSATU
competes for the rural Malay votes with the UMNO; the DAP and the PKR compete for
the urban votes; and the AMANAH competes for the Muslim votes with PAS. Notably,
the victory of PH is excessively romanticized as a common effort of Malaysian regardless
of races; in fact, it is the brilliant play of racial card crowns the PH. Unfortunately, this
repressed racial plot recurs during the Mahathir-led PH’s administration.
Shortly after the Election, Mahathir announces to substitute the Vision 2020 with
a new national blueprint, i.e., the Shared Prosperity Vision 2030 (SPV2030). The
SPV2030 appears more pragmatic compared to the Vision 2020. Its main objective is to
assist the lower income strata (Bottom 40%, B40), especially the poor bumiputra.
Meanwhile, he establishes a police force to investigate the Najib’s corruption and restores
the fund back to the exchequer. Besides, Mahathir balances his cabinet members in
accordance with the racial proportion; it is noteworthy that the Minister of Finance is
Chinese for the first time in the history of Malaysia. The most onerous and concerned
issue is when does Mahathir handover his premiership to Anwar as he promises before;
Mahathir reassures the public that it shall be done in no time, but the date is constantly
being delayed. On the other side, the UMNO and PAS keep accusing the PH government
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of neglecting the Malay interest; they represent the Malay conservatives to protest the PH
government’s misconduct. For instance, they support the Malay organizations to protest
against the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) from passing in Dec 2018. The PH coalition cannot escape from
racial politics.
The hostile towards PH from both UMNO and PAS eventually leads the latter to
form a new opposition pact in September 2019. Simultaneously, there is an internal
conflict within the Anwar-led PKR, in which the deputy chairman Azmin challenges the
Anwar’s leadership; therefore, the PKR splits into two factions, i.e., the Anwar’s faction
and the Azmin’s faction. In the meantime, there is another internal conflict within the
Mahathir-led BERSATU, in which the deputy chairman Muhyiddin wants Mahathir to
incorporate with the UMNO-PAS pact to form a new government; yet Mahathir rejects
him resolutely. These time bombs are detonated when Mahathir suddenly resigns from
his premiership and his BERSATU chairmanship, and withdraws the BERSATU from the
PH on 24 February 2020; the PH government is dissolved immediately; soon, Mahathir is
appointed as an interim Prime Minister. Within one week, the BERSATU and the Azmin’s
faction join the UMNO-PAS pact to form a new coalition, i.e., Perikatan Nasional (PN,
The National Alliance); later, PN obtains a majority to form a new government;
Muhyiddin becomes the eighth Prime Minister of Malaysia. The Malaysian accuse the
BERSATU and the Azmin’s faction for betrayal and see the PN as a backdoor government
which does not have any people’s mandate.
On the first level, hopelessness is the failure of Vision 2020. In 1991, the Vision
2020 can function as a signifier of hope because 2020 was in the future; however, when
2020 becomes an unpromising reality, the Vision 2020 is not sustainable as hope. On the
second level, hopelessness is the failure of harapan. Interestingly, the Pakatan Harapan
literally means the Coalition of Hope (harapan means hope). Hence, the collapse of PH
not only signifies a failure of a democratic reformation in Malaysia, but also symbolically
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implies a collapse of hope. On the third level, hopelessness is the failure of people. The
Malaysian envisages for a change through their ballots, but the truth is the politicians can
maneuver amongst the parties and coalitions for their own political interest. But in the
bright side, being hopelessness urges Malaysian to look forwards for the real hope and
look inwards for the hard truth.

In conclusion, the reasons why the Malaysian Chinese are facing difficulties in refashion
their identification into a bangsa Malaysia are caused by four absences in their historical
subjectivity, i.e., the absence of home, the absence of truth, the absence of past, and the
absence of hope. On the other hand, acknowledging oneself being in a state of absence
have opened up spaces for more voices to be heard.
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CONCLUSION

Race is an imperialist and colonial construction that continues to endure in Malaysia after
its independence as it serves the interest of particular group of political elites. Malaysian
becomes too adapted to the idea of race through administrative practices and ideological
inculcation. Therefore, the political elites mastering in the racial rhetoric can easily turn
the table when they are facing accusation and challenges. Sharmani P. Gabriel concludes
that race is the ‘most readily referenced signifier of difference in Malaysia.’

Race is a fundamental organizing principle in Malaysian society. Founded on the
political economy of British colonial rule in the nineteenth century, it continues
to be used in the post-colonial imagining of the nation and its identity. It is
ascendant over other markers such as class, gender and religion and remains the
most readily referenced signifier of difference in Malaysia. (Gabriel 2015, p. 783)

However, race is not an idea that has always been accessible. Under the Hindu-Buddhist
kingdom and Islamized Muslim sultanate, rakyat see themselves as a subject of the raja
residing in a kerajaan polity. During the British colonial Malaya, the colonizer started to
introduce the MCIO ethnic classification system to better rule the workforce. The rise of
nationalism in the twentieth century sees a confrontation to the local aristocracies and the
colonizers but the racism and ethnic communalism, too, has taken shape in the process of
national formation simultaneously. After the 1969 riot, the Malay political elites started
to accumulate capital and political resources; as a consequence, corruption, cronyism and
authoritarianism, in disguise as rhetoric of race and religion, becomes ubiquitous in the
political arena.
Mahathir introduced the vision of bangsa Malaysia in 1991 that offers Malaysian
an opportunity to rethink the historical idea of race in this nation. Bangsa has not always
carried the denotation of race. It signifies different forms of communal solidarity. But the
official Malaysian history assumes a race-based perspective which renders us difficult to
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reimagine a history of bangsa Malaysia that applies different foci in different historical
epoch, i.e., kerajaan in Hindu-Buddhish era, kesultanan in Islamized-Muslim era, race in
colonial and postcolonial era, and other possibilities in the future. Examining the Chinese
in Malaysia through this bangsa’s perspective, one realizes that they have adjusted their
local consciousness in accordance with how inclusivity of the Malaysian identity, and the
memories that are not compatible with the official account will be sidelined or eliminated
completely. These moments of absence shape the historical subjectivities of Malaysian
Chinese and invite more conversation in the future.
The conception and application of race is rather fluid than fixed, and the notion
of bangsa has shown us possibilities in defining what race means. Finally, I would like to
conclude this thesis with a remark from Gabriel.

The meaning of race produced within such signifying practices can never be
finally fixed or settled as it is subject to contexts which are themselves always
shifting. (Gabriel 2015, p. 803)
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NOTES

1. Bumiputera, meaning the son of the soil, is used in Malaysia to indicate the Malays
and the indigenous people.
2. Shaariibuugiin Altantuyaa, a Mongolian woman who worked for Najib’s aide, Abdul
Razak Baginda, was found dead after she blackmailed Baginda about his allegations
of corruption and an affair. Many deemed the homicide was related to Najib.
3. Buku Harapan was a booklet published by Pakatan Harapan before the General
Election in 2018. In the booklet, it made sixty promises, which covered five pillars: (a)
reduce the people’s burden; (b) institutional and political reform; (c) spur sustainable
and equitable economic growth; (d) return Sabah and Sarawak to the status accorded
by the Malaysia Agreement 1963; and (e) create a Malaysia that is inclusive, moderate,
and respected globally.
4. The Malaysian government classified its people into three income groups: T20 (Top
20%), M40 (Medium 40%), and B40 (Bottom 40%).
5. Conventionally, the electoral diagram will shade the UMNO Malay-based
constituencies in red colour, the PAS Muslim-based constituencies in green colour,
and the KEADILAN non-Malay and mixed constituencies in blue colour, following
their party flag.
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